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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
(collectively "SARMC") have appealed an award of$36.3 million. On August 31, 2007, an Ada 
County jury found SARMC liable to its former partner, MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), 1 for 
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of its 
partnership agreement, wrongful dissociation, tortious inference, and conspiracy. The facts 
established at trial are as follows: 
A. SARMC's Interest in MRI as a New Technology 
In 1980, the neuroscience physicians at SARMC began investigating magnetic resonance 
imaging ("MRI") technology as the next state-of-the-art imaging modality. (Trial Ex. 4022.) 
They determined that MRI technology was essential for SARMC to remain the preeminent 
neuroscience center in Idaho. By 1984, SARMC formed a general partnership (MRIA) with five 
physicians (later known as "DMR"), Mercy Medical Center in Nampa and Caldwell Memorial 
Hospital (n/k/a West Valley Regional Medical Center) to develop a jointly owned and operated 
MRI center located on SARMC's campus. (Id) (Trial Exs. 4022 & 4023; TR Vol. II at I IOI :19-
1105:10.) 
B. MRIA's Formation, Fundraising and Governance. 
To initially fund MRIA's business and purchase the necessary equipment, the partners created 
1 References to MRIA also include MRI Limited Partnership aka MRI Center of Idaho 
("MRI CI") and MRI Mobile ("MRIM"). For the Court's reference, a "Cast of Characters" has 
been attached as Exhibit A to the Appendix. 
I 
MRJ Limited Partnership which offered limited partnership interests in the business. (TR Vol. II 
at 1108:11-1110:22.) MRJA, the general partner ofMRJ Limited Partnership, had overall 
responsibility for running the business, known as MRI Center ofldaho ("MRICI").2 (Trial Ex. 
4024 at § 4. I; TR Vol. II at 1108:24-1109:5.) MRI CI acquired a MRJ scanner which was placed 
on SARMC's campus and began operations. (TR Vol. II at 1325:21-1326:11.) 
MRJA created a Board of Partners which directed the affairs of MRI CI. (TR Vol. II at 
1315:21-1316:12.) Each hospital partner and each partner physician in DMR was a voting 
member of the board. Board meetings were held monthly, typically chaired by SARMC's CEO. 
(Id. at 1122:21-1123:25;1345:19-23.) 
MRJCI was viewed by the medical community, and treated by SARMC, as part ofSARMC's 
radiology department. (Id. at 1418:7-11; 2420:1-4) MRICI's business benefitted from this 
association. "It's always good to be ... part ofa flagship like St. Al's. We were known as the 
MRJ at St. Al's. Being backed by some huge corporation was extremely valuable [for 
marketing] .. .in the field and with the referring physicians." (Id. at 2420:11-16.) SARMC-
employed physicians and physicians with privileges at SARMC referred patients to MRJCI 
because of its affiliation with SARMC. (Id at 1517:12-19.) 
C. The Partnership Agreement Limited Withdrawal and Competition. 
Article 6 of the MRJA Partnership Agreement provides the "Conditions for Withdrawal" by a 
hospital partner. That section expressly limits a hospital partner's ability to withdraw from 
2 MRJA later became general partner of a mobile MRJ scanning business, MRIM. (Trial Ex. 
4028.) 
2 
MRIA, without breaching the agreement, to four narrow circumstances. (Trial Ex. 4023 at§ 6.1.) 
Article 9 of the agreement prohibits partners and "affiliates" from engaging in competing 
"business activities" within 100 miles of MRI CI. Waiver of this non-compete provision requires 
a unanimous vote of the Board. (Trial Ex. 4023 at§ 9.4.) 
D. The Delivery of MRI Services 
MRI services involve two components: 
• The "technical component," which includes MRI scanning equipment, technicians 
who run the equipment, and the creation of the images. MRI CI provided the technical 
component of the service; and, 
• The "professional component," which involves setting the "protocols" for the scan and 
reading of the image. This component is provided by radiologists who diagnose 
disease through interpretation of the MRI image. 
(TR Vol. II at 1128:7-1136:9.) In practice, physicians with patients requiring radiologic 
evaluation contact a radiologist to determine whether MRI will assist in diagnosing a disease. 
(Id. at 1128:24-1129:9.) If an MRI is needed, the physician "refers" the patient to an MRI 
center for imaging. After the images are created, the radiologist reads the image and reports his 
findings to the referring physician. Thus, the ref erring physician's point of contact is the 
radiologist. (TR Vol. III at 3618:14-3619:15.) 
From MRIA's formation, SARMC designated St. Alphonsus Radiology Group ("SARO" n/k/a 
Gem State Radiology and hereinafter "GSR" or the "radiologists") as the exclusive reader of 
radiologic images on SARMC's campus. (TR Vol. II, at 2308:14-2309:7.) GSR and MRIA 
worked together in a collegial and cooperative manner (TR Vol. II at 1110:23-1111:12; 2383:16-
25; 3165: 14-24) until 1998, when GSR initiated plans to build its own imaging center in Boise 
3 
(known as Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI")), which would compete with MRIA. The 
present dispute arises out of SARMC's decision to advance, support and partner with GSR in 
!MI' s business while still a partner in MRIA. 
E. GSR Plans to Build IMI and Invites SARMC to be a Partner. 
In 1998, GSR became concerned that most of its income was derived from its services contract 
with SARMC, (Id. at 1445:15-1447:3; Trial Ex. 4047) and the consequences ofSARMC 
terminating that arrangement. (TR Vol. II at 1447:5-1448:6.) Desiring autonomy from SARMC, 
GSR decided to establish its own independent imaging center. (Id. at 1446:6-1448:6; Trial Ex. 
4052.) 
GSR, however, knew that if it opened an imaging center that competed with SARMC, 
SARMC's CEO, Sandra Bruce, would react negatively and refuse to renew GSR's services 
contract. (TR Vol. II at 1455:9-1456:24.) GSR's solution was to invite SARMC to participate in 
IMI. (Id.) Although Bruce's initial reaction was negative, she warmed to the idea, ultimately 
seeking 50% of the new business. (Id. at 1456:21-1457:22; Trial Ex. 4057.) 
When SARMC and GSR announced their intention to partner in the new imaging center, 
SARMC understood that to avoid violating the noncompete clause in the MRIA partnership 
agreement, MRIA needed to participate in the new imaging center. (Trial Ex. 4062; TR Vol. II at 
l 741:9-1742:20.) For that reason, SARMC requested MRIA to pursue a partnership with GSR 
to eliminate this conflict. (TR Vol. II at 1152:20-1153:9, 1748:22-1750:24.) MRIA pursued 
discussions with GSR, offering Dr. Thomas Henson's (ofDMR) one-eleventh ownership interest 
in MRIA (which included a seat on the Board of Partners), to the radiologists. (Id.at! 152:20-
4 
1155:4; 1788: 19-1790: 15.) This approach would join MRIA and IMI and create an opportunity 
for MRIA to expand its business. (Id. at 1153: 19-1154:9.) In Spring 1999, a deal for the purchase 
of Dr. Henson's interest was, according to GSR and MRIA, "very close to being finalized." (Id. 
at 1157:6-22; Trial Ex. 4079.) 
F. SARMC Sabotages MRIA's Negotiations with GSR. 
In June 1999, Sandra Bruce injected herself into the MRIA/GSR negotiations and unbeknownst 
to MRIA, asked GSR to backbumer its discussions with MRIA to complete a deal with SARMC. 
(Id. at 1164:2-1166:16, 1767:20-1769: 11; Trial Ex. 4101.) SARMC then offered GSR a better 
deal: a 50% interest in an MR imaging operation on its campus, with SARMC owning the other 
50%. (Id.at 1788: 19-1790:15; 1786:15-19; 2371 :4-10.) Predictably GSR agreed to pursue 
SARMC's proposal, and terminated its discussions with MRIA. (TR Vol. II, 1166:1-1168:20) 
Bruce's interference with MRIA's negotiations revealed her long term ambition to "align" 
SARMC with GSR. "(A]t least as far back as 1999" and before IMI opened, Bruce and her 
COO, Cindy Schamp, pursued a relationship between SARMC and GSR whereby they would 
establish imaging centers (with MRI) "throughout the region." (TR Vol. II at 1795:3-11, 
2270: 17-2271 :6.) Such a strategy clearly violated the MRIA non-compete provision. (Trial Ex. 
4023 at§ 9.) This strategy also included the concept that SARMC would buy MRICI from 
MRIA and sell 50% of that operation to GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1795:6-1798:20.) 
By mid-1999, SARMC retained consultants to explore options to exit or "restructure" MRIA 
so SARMC could achieve its objectives. Consultant Alan Hahn was hired to explore four 
"scenarios" whereby SARMC would take control of the MRIA board and either liquidate MRIA 
5 
or offer GSR an equity position in MRICI that excluded the DMR physicians. (Trial Ex. 4118.) 
Hahn was also requested to evaluate the contractual implications if SARMC withdrew from 
MRIA and competed. Hahn's evaluation ("Scenario 5") concluded that withdrawal would 
breach the MRIA partnership agreement and could lead to litigation. (Trial Ex. 4138 at 16.) 
Hahn's reports were not disclosed to MRIA. (TR. Vol. II at 1199:5-23.) 
In fall 1999, SARMC began exchanging with GSR confidential draft operating agreements for 
. IMI. (Trial Exs. 4115 &4125). Those drafts describe ajoint venture where: 
• Neither SARMC nor SARMC's "Affiliate" (which would include MRIA) could expand 
in Ada or Canyon counties without GSR's permission. (Ex. 4115 §7.3.1) 
• SARMC and GSR agreed to pursue development of an imaging center in Meridian (a 
location which MRIA had picked to establish an imaging center. (Ex. 4115 §7.3.3) 
• SARMC would receive an option to purchase 50% of any IMI imaging facility in Ada 
and Canyon counties. 
SARMC's separate, confidential negotiations assured that GSR would partner with SARMC, 
rather than MRIA. Consequently MRIA was deprived of the business opportunity to partner 
with IMI. Moreover, MRIA was forced to accept SARMC's exclusive radiology group. GSR- as 
the exclusive radiological readers for its business, meaning that GSR would interface with 
MRIA's customer base. (Trial Ex. 4104, 4137; TR Vol. II at 1488:8-1489:3.) When MRIA 
requested SARMC's permission to "contract directly with radiologists" who were not MRIA's 
competitors, SARMC ignored such requests. (Trial Ex. 4137; TR Vol. II at 1175:23-1176: 11, 
1182:9-14.) 
G. Although SARMC Knew it Must Buy its Way Out of MRIA to Join IMI, 
SARMC Stalled Negotiations While MRIA's Value Diminished. 
6 
When !MI opened in Fall 1999, SARMC clearly understood it could neither withdraw from the 
partnership, nor participate in !MI without violating the MRIA partnership agreement. (Trial 
Exs. 4137, 4138 at 16, 4149, 4150; TR Vol. II at 1690:21-1697:14.) According to SARMC's 
own documents, any participation in !MI was a breach of the non-compete clause: "A waiver for 
St. Alphonsus to participate in the imaging business of !MI reguires a unanimous favorable vote 
from all general partners." (Trial Exs. 4137, 4149, 4150, 4118, & 4147).3 
Recognizing that there was no easy "way around" the non-compete provisions to achieve its 
objective of partnering with GSR, SARMC shifted focus in early 2000 to purchasing MRICI, 
voiding the non-compete and sharing MRICI with GSR. (TR Vol. II at 1197:10-13, 1520:2-
152:16, 1812:12-24, 2057:2-12). In February 2000, representatives ofSARMC and MRIA 
discussed a fair market value of $22 million for MRICI. (Id at 1519:6-1525: 10, Ex. 4144.) 
3 At trial SARMC argued that it could participate in IMI, but only in the "non MRI" business 
(i.e., x-ray, CT, ultrasound). This position ignores reality and the partnership agreement. First, 
the non compete clause prohibited SARMC from engaging in a competitive diagnostic imaging 
center within I 00 miles of SARMC. Second, the non compete clause prohibited partner 
controlled "affiliates" from competing with MRIA. The unrebutted testimony of Bruce Budge 
was that !MI was commonly controlled by SARMC and the radiologists. (TR Vol. II at 2780:3-
12.) Third, it was impossible to separately support the "non MRI" side ofIMI..IMI was one 
business, with one functional staff, and one management committee. (TR Vol. II at 1603 :2-5; 
1605:21-1606:7) As far as customers were concerned, it was just "one big imaging center" that 
marketed itself as one business (1601:4-1603:17). Moreover, there is no indication that SARMC 
ever tried to parse its participation in !MI (See supra Part I. H. ). The trial court recognized that 
the MRI/non-MRI distinction was a myth: "there was ample evidence that IMI operated as one 
business and that the MRI/non-MRI distinction did not in fact exist. (R Vol. XIII p. 2439.) 
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Unfortunately, $22 million wasn't ever in the "realm of discussion" for SARMC. (TR Vol. II at 
1199:5-23; 1525:6-1528:8; TR Vol. III at 3559:4-3560:13, 3567:10-13.)4 With no intention of 
paying that kind of money, SARMC dragged its feet, making no offer to purchase MRICI. (TR 
Vol. II 1201:20-1202:17, 1212:22-1213:7, 1841:7-1842:14, 1845:5-6, 1919:19-23.) There was 
method in this. SARMC understood that after !MI entered the market and started to take MRIA's 
customer base: "the cheapest thing to do [would be] nothing." (Id at 2662: 17-2665: 10; Trial Ex. 
4154 at 1.) In other words, rather than negotiate a deal, SARMC would stand by and watch 
MRIA's patient volumes "dwindle away," (Id at 2664:3-2665:10) thereby allowing SARMC to 
purchase MRICI for a reduced price. (Id) SARMC pursued this strategy even though it knew 
such a strategy was unethical. (Id at I 869: 15-1870:20.) 
H. While SARMC was Still an MRIA Partner, SARMC Helped IMI Establish Itself 
as a Competitor of MRIA. 
I. IMI was Established with SARMC's Support 
Although SARMC understood it could not participate in IM! without breaching its obligations 
to MRIA, it did so anyway. Basically, SARMC was feathering its nest in anticipation of 
formally joining !ML Before !MI opened its doors in 1999, SARMC had already begun to invest 
in its new partner. 
SARMC has already made a number of tangible investments into IMI, including the 
following: providing SARMC's case volume, database, technical component charges, staffing 
4 A consistent theme throughout the trial was that "cash was tight" for SARMC. When SARMC 
hired Shattuck Hammond ("SH") in 2001, SARMC told SH it was only interested in a buyout 
strategy that would not require any SARMC funds because "capital was tight." (TR Vol. II at 
2090; Trial Ex. 4247 at 5.) In 2003, it again was noted that "money was a big issue" for 
SARMC; it was "tight on cash." (TR Vol. II at 1567:14-1568:8) 
8 
costs, and other operational data for IMI's use in its business plan; linking !MI to its intranet 
between the hospital and its physician network; supporting Karen Noyes, assistant director of 
the SARMC radiology department, in joining IMI as executive director; converting SARMC 
to the same digital radiography system as !Ml. 
(Trial Ex. 4095; see also Trial Ex. 4074.) GSR meeting minutes further reflect that "financing 
[for IMIJ was contingent on a partnership with the hospital." (Trial Ex. 545 (emphasis added).) 
2. SARMC's IT Support Gives IMI a Competitive Edge Over MRIA. 
From IMI's inception, SARMC partnered with GSR to convert IMI's technology from film to 
digital imaging. This paradigm shift (which SARMC supported at IMI but not MRIA) provided 
!MI a huge competitive advantage over MRICI. (Ex. 4107; TR Vol. II. 1618:22-1619:3, 
1497:15-1502:24.) SARMC helped bring this "digital revolution to !MI" by initially investing 
several hundred thousand dollars in !MI' s IT system. (TR Vol. II at 1505: I 0-1507: IO; Trial Ex. 
4095.) The investment by SARMC in "dark fiber" connectivity to IMI, alone, was $780,000. 
(Trial Ex. 423lat 3; TR Vol. II at 1509:6-13.) In sum, SARMC "was there with [!MI] making 
that investment in getting doctors over the technology hump" and helping bring the "digital 
revolution" to IM! while MRIA was left in the cold. (Id. at 1505:10-15; 1634:12-15; 2433:22-
2440:7.)5 
5 As part of the IT support, SARMC and IMI had direct contact with MRIA's customers, the 
referring physicians. (Id. at 1621:7-20; 1639:18-24.) SARMC provided laptops that allowed 
referring physicians to view !MI reports and images, but not MRIA reports and images. (Id. at 
2432: 10-2435: I; 2436:21-2437:6; 2439: I 0-17; 2453:6-24543:9.) SARMC and GSR also formed 
an "ITPACS" committee staffed by knowledgeable SARMC IT personnel which planned the 
future of the "entire digital paradigm shift for [SARMC], the radiologists and IMI." (Id. at 
1619:12-1621:20.) MRIA was not allowed to attend ITPACS meetings. (Id. at 2437:18-2439:9.) 
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3. Financial Support Before SARMC Withdrew From MRIA 
In addition to the financiaJ investment in IT set forth above, SARMC, while still a partner in 
MRIA, gave !MI $546,146 and assumed almost $1.5 million ofIMI's debt. (Id. at 1557:4-
1558:2; 1622:22-1623:8.) 
4. SARMC/IMI's Joint Marketing to Shift Referrals from MRIA to IMI. 
While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC worked with IMI to obtain a combined market share 
for MRI, in direct competition with MRIA. (Trial Ex. 4248; TR Vol. II at 1643:7-13; TR Vol. III 
at 4169:10-17.) SARMC and IMijointly marketed by television, radio, newspapers, letters to 
referring physicians and physician-to-physician office visits. (Trial Exs. 4248 & 4107; TR Vol. II 
at 1643:23-1644:22.) This pervasive marketing effort had the goal of promoting both SARMC 
and IMI to referring physicians. (TR Vol. II at 1646:1-7.) Because affiliation with SARMC was a 
strong marketing tool, marketing for MRIA became difficult by early 2000 when IMI was being 
marketed as SARMC's MRI imaging center as (Id. at 2420:11-16, 2428:21-2429:6.) it caused 
confusion among the referring doctors as to which imaging center was affiliated with SARMC. 
5. SARMC Visibly Shifts its Name Association to IMI by Making IMI a 
SARMC "Outpatient Facility" 
While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC made IMI an outpatient facility for SARMC. (Id. at 
1582:10-1583:24, Trial Ex. 4209.) This development was communicated to the referring doctor 
community (MRIA's source of business) causing MRIA to lose scans as doctors became "used to 
sending patients to IMI, not just for CT, but for MRI as well." (Id. at 1583: 17-24.) 
6. SARMC's Usurpation ofMRIA's Meridian Opportunity 
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While still a partner in MRIA, SARMC and GSR agreed to pursue and establish IMI Meridian 
(aka IMI West), which would include an MRI scanner. (Trial Exs. 4115, 4211 & 4275; TR Vol. 
II at 1590:11-23; 1613:5-12; 1615:20-23.) SARMC provided this support even though it knew 
MRIA was planning to expand operations into Meridian and thereby usurped MRIA's 
opportunity to establish an MRI scanner in Meridian. To add insult to injury MRICI and MRIM 
lost scans to IMI Meridian. (Trial Exs. 4425, 4515, 4516, & 4517.) 
I. SARMC Condones and/or Turns a Blind Eye to Conduct by the Radiologists 
Intended to Shift Referrals from MRIA to IMI. 
Shortly after !MI opened in fall 1999, MRIA began to notice a "shift in attitude" in the 
radiologists relative to the performance of their responsibilities at MRICI. (TR Vol. II at 
1176: 19-1177:3.) Initially, this shift in attitude was demonstrated by reduced time and attention 
in MRI Cl's "lab" as well as inadequate support of MRI Cl's technicians. (Id at 1176:19-1177:3; 
2385:2-2387: 1; 2511 :3-24.) MRIA requested Bruce to intervene and return radiologist service 
to its previous, professional level; 
'The time has come for SARMC to insist [that its radiologists] provide full, supportive 
radiologic coverage of the lab at historical levels of professionalism and service .... [Such 
coverage] cannot be allowed to be withdrawn simply because the radiologists of the lab are 
now also its competitors. We now view as a necessity SARMC's providing the lab with full, 
supportive, traditional radiologist coverage or permitting the MRI Center of Idaho to contract 
directly with radiologists as a fiduciary responsibility of SARMC to its other general and 
limited partners. 
(Trial Ex. 4137 at 2.) Bruce never responded to MRIA's request. (TR Vol. II at 1182:9-14.) 
As time progressed, and SARMC's relationship with IMI deepened, the radiologists became 
bolder in their unfair tactics. For example, (1) the radiologists unilaterally reduced their weekday 
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hours at MRICI, while IMI increased its hours of service for its MRI modality; and (2) the 
radiologists completely cancelled weekend support to MRICI, except for emergency cases. (See, 
Trial Ex. 4277 &4309; TR Vol. II at 1653:23-1655:25; 2195:2-17; 2392:5-24.) The result to 
MRICI was increased cost and a substantial loss of scan volume. (Trial Ex. 4292, 4519; TR Vol. 
II 2494:7-2499:18, 2507:9-2508:10; 2509:14-2510:15.) 
Before IMI's opening, the radiologists had provided 24 hour a day, seven day a week coverage 
(24/7) to SARMC's radiology department and MRICI. (TR Vol. II at 2496:8-12.) After IMI 
opened, the only modality not receiving 24/7 coverage at SARMC was MRICI. (Id. at 2195:2-
2197:4.) Although SARMC understood that this change in hours of coverage had a "huge 
impact" on MRIA's ability to do business, SARMC did nothing to change the situation. (Id) 
J. In June 2001, SARMC, While Still a MRIA Partner, Formalized its 
Partnership with IMI by Executing an Operating Agreement. 
In June, 2001, SARMC formalized its relationship with GSR and IMI through execution of the 
Operating Agreement of Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC. (Trial Ex. 4226.)6 In salient part, 
the agreement provided: 
• SARMC would contribute over $500,000 to IMI. (Trial Ex. 4226 at§ 4.1.) 
• SARMC would not establish an imaging center in Ada or Canyon County without offering the 
radiologists the right to participate in such venture. (Id. at §7.3.1.) 
• SARMC and GSR would develop an imaging center in Meridian, Idaho. (Id.at§ 7.3.3.) 
6 To avoid the perception of blatantly breaching the non-compete provisions of the MRIA 
partnership agreement, SARMC included in the final draft of the Operating Agreement language 
that purportedly limited the agreement to the alleged "non-MRI" operation of the company. 
Testimony at trial, however, from IMI's own executive director demonstrated that this Operating 
Agreement related to IMI's entire business, including its magnetic resonance imaging operation 
(TR. Vol. II at 1600:2-1604:7, 1613:9-12, 1616:10-1621:15, 1630:1~1631:17; see also footnote 
3) 
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• !Mi's 6 member Management Committee would consist of 3 representatives from SARMC. 
(Id. at§ 8.1, TR Vol. III at 3720:10-3723:11.) 
• SARMC and the radiologists would enter into an IT services agreement and create an 
ITPACS committee governing all IMI modalities. (Id. at§ 13.2 and Exhibit 13.2 thereto; TR 
Vol. II at 1618:18-1619:11.) 
The Operating Agreement also described a process whereby SARMC would "make available" to 
the radiologists a 50% interest in MRICI. (Trial Ex. 4226 at§ 7.3.2.) The terms of this 
Operating Agreement were never revealed to MRIA. (TR Vol. II at 1297: 18-24.) 
K. After Signing the IMI Operating Agreement, SARMC Hired Shattuck 
Hammond to Present Options to Circumvent The MRIA Non-Compete. 
SARMC's COO, Cindy Schamp, hired Grant Chamberlain of investment bank Shattuck 
Hammond ("SH") to perform a Strategic Options Assessment ("SOA'') evaluating the options 
available to SARMC for meeting its objectives of owning MRI CI and joint venturing with GSR 
in other MRI facilities. (Trial Ex. 4239; TR Vol. II at 2547: 12-2548:24.). In the course of its 
work, SH employees discussed various strategic options with SARMC representatives. (Trial Ex. 
4239). The results of these discussions were included in an "Overview" (the "Finnerty 
Memorandum") describing alternatives then being considered by SARMC. (Id.; TR Vol. II at 
2562:3-21.). The document reveals that, as of September 2001: 
• SARMC anticipated litigation if it withdrew from MRIA. 
• SARMC understood that it owed a fiduciary duty to the Limited Partnerships and risked 
breaching that duty, if it withdrew. 
• SARMC understood that if its termination was "wrongful," MRIA would be entitled to 
damages arising from subsequent competition with MRIA. 
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• SARMC would not support the future growth of MRIA as long as there was no plan to 
allow SARMC to meet its strategic goals of partnering with GSR.7 
• SARMC refused to use SARMC funds to buyout MRICI. (Trial Ex. 4239 at 2, 11-13). 
In November 2001, SH delivered to SARMC its final SOA and Valuation Analysis of MRI 
Associates. (Trial Ex. 4247, 4246). Page 5 of the SOA discusses SARMC's objectives relative to 
partnering with GSR: (1) SARMC considered it a ''strategic imperative" to partner with GSR to 
pursue "outpatient diagnostic imaging opportunities in SARMC's service area"; (2) SARMC 
wanted control of MRICI; and, (3) SARMC sought to avoid the prohibitions in the non-compete. 
The SOA evaluated 5 different "structural alternatives" (including withdrawal) which would 
attain SARMC's stated objectives.8 Given the business and litigation risks associated with these 
alternatives, SH recommended that SARMC acquire all general and limited partner interests in 
MRICI, leaving MRIA with only its mobile operation (Option 1). Upon acquiring MRICI, 
SARMC could then merge that operation into IMI. According to the SOA the net cost to 
SARMC for executing this strategy was $27.3 million. (Trial Ex. 4247.) 
Ken Fry, SARMC's CFO, believed that SH's purchase price ofMRICI was "fair" and that the 
recommendation to purchase MRICI (Option 1) was a good approach (Id at 2085:7-2087:12).9 
7 At trial, SARMC representatives vehemently denied that they had taken steps to inhibit the 
growth of MRIA' s mobile business, even though meeting minutes indicate otherwise. (TR Vol. 
II at 1882:6-1885:8; Trial Ex. 4221.) 
8 The SOA warns SAR.MC (as did Alan Hahn) that "[aJ waiver for SARMC to participate in the 
imaging business of IMI requires a unanimous favorable vote from all general partners of 
MRIA." (TR Vol. II at 1693:24-1694:15; Trial Ex. 4149.) 
9 Fry also testified repeatedly that Bruce and Schamp were involved in the process of reviewing 
the SH report and attended a presentation of the report by Chamberlain. (TR Vol. II at 2079: 12-
18, 2082:4-14, 2084:7-15, 2088:1-5.) Amazingly, both Bruce and Schamp claimed ignorance as 
to the contents of the SH reports. (Id. at 1886:2-8, 2376:8-2377:19.) 
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However, SARMC never communicated the results of the valuation to MRIA, and never made 
an offer to buy MRICI. (TR Vol. II at 2088:6-2089:18; 2092:21-2094:23). Fry did not know why 
an offer was not made, but was aware that "capital was pretty tight" during that timeframe. (Id at 
2090:3-14; 2094:9-13.) Copies of SH's reports were never provided to MRIA. (Id at 2098: 10-
12). 10 
In fall 2003, after MRI CI scan volumes had dropped precipitously, 11 Bruce requested a 
meeting of the MRIA Board of Partners where she presented a three month timeline for the 
buyoutofMRICI. (TR Vol. Hat 1217:1-12, 1920:4-9; 1931:I0-18.)Shestatedthatifthe 
transaction did not occur timely, SARMC would consider withdrawal from the partnership. 
(Trial Ex. 4309, TR Vol. II at 1920:14-1922:1.) Given that SARMC had been dragging its feet 
on a buyout since 2000, MRIA questioned Bruce's motives. (TR Vol. II at 1222:12-1223:7.) 
SARMC's proposal was made more difficult by two other demands: (I) that GSR participate in 
the negotiations to buyout MRICI, thereby requiring MRIA to disclose confidential information 
to its competitor, and (2) that Grant Chamberlain, SARMC's consultant, be used to facilitate the 
negotiations. (TR Vol. II at 1224:16-1231:7.) 
In a meeting on December 17, 2003, MRIA proposed that it be given 120 days to prepare a fair 
market value for SARMC's purchase ofMRICI. (TR Vol. II at 1231:9-1232:17.) SARMC never 
JO MRIA partners had been interviewed by Grant Chamberlain in 2001, and had been promised a 
"fair market buyout" number as a result of his work. Chamberlain was not heard from after "a 
couple of meetings" and MRIA was never provided with an explanation. (TR Vol. II at 1213:8-
1215:20.) 
11 The evidence at trial showed that !MI enjoyed a corresponding jump in its scan volumes at this 
same time. (Trial Ex. 4518; TR Vol. II at 2796:15-2797:1.) 
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responded to this request. (TR Vol. II at 1232:12-17.) Instead, on February 24, SARMC notified 
MRJA that SARMC was withdrawing from MRJA in 30 days and threatened that, only ifMRJA 
paid SARMC its departing partner share, would SARMC delay competition with MRIA for one 
year. (Trial Ex. 4329; TR Vol. II at 1952:22-25.) Bruce admitted that SARMC withdrew from 
MRIA to partner with the radiologists and that she understood SARMC might be liable for 
wrongful dissociation damages. (TR Vol. II at 1943:15-24, 1950:9-15.) 
Upon receipt of SARMC' s notice of withdrawal, MRIA' s other hospital partners approached 
SARMC with the fair market value buyout that MRJA had been working on since its December 
meeting with SARMC. (Trial Ex. 4322.) Although the proposal from MRJA was the deal 
SARMC had requested in September of 2003, SARMC rejected the offer solely because it was 
"too late." (TR Vol. II at 1954:4-8; 1954:15-1955:2.) 
After withdrawal SARMC and GSR moved a mobile MRI scanner onto SARMC's campus for 
IM!, within 100 feet ofMRICI's operation. (TR Vol. II at 2173:21-24.) In mid December 2005, 
SARMC notified its medical and nursing staff of the transition of all SARMC MRI imaging 
business to the IMI mobile scanner: 
"A.s you may be aware, St. Alphonsus and Gem State Radiology are currently in the process 
of transitioning MRJ Services at St. Alphonsus. We are excited about our plans to bring MRJ 
imaging into our hospital in partnership with these exceptional radiologists .... " (Trial Ex. 
4316.) 
"As of[December 19, 2005], St. Alphonsus MRJ [!Mi's mobile unit at SARMC] will be the 
sole provider of MRI services for all Saint Alphonsus inpatient, outpatient and ED 
[ emergency department] patients .... MRI of Idaho [MRI CI] will no longer provide services to 
St. Alphonsus connected patients ..... " (Trial Ex. 4377.) 
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By the end of 2005, SARMC had accomplished the objectives it had articulated and pursued 
since 1999: SARMC had partnered with GSR in IMI on its campus, in downtown Boise and in 
Meridian. As a result of SARMC's efforts and the combined conduct of SARMC and GSR in 
IM!, virtually all ofMRICI's business had been diverted to !MI. (Trial Ex. 4519; TR Vol. II at 
2767:25-2768:6.) SARMC had effectively exited the MRIA partnership and accomplished its 
objectives without paying anything to MRIA, leaving MRIA struggling to stay in business 
(1301 :7-1302:1). 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
MRIA presents the following issues for cross-appeal: (I) did the trial court err by ruling 
SARMC did not owe statutory fiduciary duties to MRICI and MRIM; (2) did the trial court err 
by denying MRIA's request to seek punitive damages, and (3) did the trial court err by 
dismissing MRIA' s antitrust claim. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Because the gravamen of this case is a commercial transaction, MRIA requests its attorneys' 
fees and costs on appeal pursuant to LC. §12-120(3) and Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
SARMC is appealing from "an award in the amount of$36.3 million" in MRIA's favor. At 
trial, the jury awarded MRIA $63.5 Million, an amount whi~h was the sum of two separate 
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damage figures submitted for the jury's consideration: $36.3Million12 (MRIA's lost profits 
analysis) and $27.3 million (representing wrongful dissociation damages). These two damages 
figures were combined by the jury on the verdict form as a result of SARMC's insistence that the 
verdict form contain only one line for the damages figure rather than two lines, as requested by 
MRIA's counsel. (R. Vol. XIII at 2434-35.) Recognizing the jury's addition of these two 
figures could be cured by remittitur, MRIA requested the court to "pull apart" the two damage 
figures combined on the verdict form. SARMC did not oppose this request, acknowledging the 
damage figures had been added, and urging the court in its motion for new trial to reduce the 
amount of the verdict, in lieu of granting a new trial. (R., Ex. 208 at 5.) 
The trial court ordered a remittitur reducing the verdict from $63.5 million to $36.3 million, on 
the basis that the jury, due to error invited by SARMC, added the two alternative damage 
amounts. 13 (R., Vol. XIII, 2434-2435.) The trial court denied SARMC's new trial request 
finding there was substantial evidence "as to the claims for relief and the damages ... [to 
support] the reduced award." (/d.) Thus, SARMC's appeal is an appeal from the Court's denial 
of a request for a new trial. 
On a motion for new trial, the trial court has the responsibility to weigh the evidence and the 
circumstances of the trial and determine whether a fair trial was had. Dinneen v. Finch, I 00 
12 MRIA expert Bruce Budge testified that the lost profits through 2006 were $15.4 million and 
MRIA expert Charles Wilhoite testified that the lost profits from 2007 to 2023 were $20.9 
million for a total of$36.3 million. (TR Vol. II at 2760:16-2761 :5; TR Vol. III at 2860:11-16.) 
13 The trial court found "the only testimony as to damage figures came from MRIA's witnesses, 
Mr. Budge and Mr. Wilhoite. Mr. Wilhoite's testimony supported the higher of the two amounts, 
$36.3 million." (R., Vol. XIII, p.2435.) 
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Idaho 620, 625-27, 603 P.2d 575, 580-82 (1979). A trial court has this responsibility because an 
appellate court is not in a position to "weigh" the evidence. Id. at 626,603 P.2d at 581. 
Consequently, the standard of review for a denial of a motion for new trial is manifest abuse of 
discretion. Id. This "more liberal rule" of review "recognizes the advantage enjoyed by the trial 
court in reviewing the case because of the court's active participation in the trial." Seppi v. Betty, 
99 Idaho 186, 189,579 P.2d 683,686 (1978). 
Here, the appealed award of$36.3 million is a product of both the jury's effort in determining 
lost profits and the court's independent review in determining the amount of remittitur. Because 
the award was evaluated independently by the trial court, in the remittitur process, the standard 
of review should be "manifest abuse of discretion" rather than substantial evidence. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined SARMC Wrongfully Dissociated. 
The trial court did not err when it ruled as a matter of law that SARMC wrongfully dissociated 
from MRIA. Before trial, both MRIA and SARMC moved for summary judgment on the issue. 
(R. Vol. II at 386.) The resolution of the question turned upon the interpretation of Section 6.1 
of the MRIA Partnership Agreement (Trial Ex. 4023, § 6.1) and that section's interaction with 
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"), which authorizes a partner to dissociate from 
the partnership at any time, but provides that dissociation is "wrongful" if it is a breach of an 
express provision of the partnership agreement. l.C. § 53-3-602(b)(l). 14 When a partner 
14 Importantly, RUPA governs a partnership only to the extent the affairs are not governed by an 
agreement among the partners. I. C. § 53-3-103. The official comment clarifies that RUPA is a 
gap filler. See I.C. § 53-3-103, cmt. I. 
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wrongfully dissociates, the statute provides that the partner "is liable to the partnership and to the 
other partners for damages caused by the dissociation." LC. 53-3-602(c). 
The trial court held that Section 6.1 of the partnership agreement made dissociation wrongful 
in all but four limited circumstances. Section 6.1, which is entitled "Conditions of Withdrawal," 
provides: 
Any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the partnership at anytime if ... continued 
participation in this partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such Hospital 
Partner or its parent or their subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardizes Medicare/Medicaid or 
insurance reimbursements or participations; (iii) if the business activities of the 
Partnership are contrary to the ethical principles of the Roman Catholic Church as 
designated from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in violation of any local, state or 
federal laws, rules or regulations. 
(Trial Ex. 4023, § 6.1.) Determining SARMC had not withdrawn pursuant to these conditions, 
the trial court held that SARMC's withdrawal was in breach of the partnership agreement, and 
thus was wrongful under RUPA. (R. Vol. II at 388-96, Vol. III at 538-46.) 
1. Section 6.1 Unambiguously Limits SARMC's right to Withdraw 
Section 6.1, "Conditions of Withdrawal", unambiguously limits SARMC's right to withdraw 
from the partnership. Despite this plain language, SARMC argues the section does not restrict 
SARMC's right to withdraw and should be interpreted as a permissive grant of authority to 
withdraw from the partnership without causing dissolution. The trial court correctly rejected this 
argument, determining Section 6.1 "clearly and unequivocally" limited SARMC's right to 
withdraw from the partnership to the four listed circumstances. (R. Vol. II at 395.) 
By its express terms, Section 6.1 contains the parties' agreement on the "Conditions for 
Withdrawal." The word "Conditions" must be given its ordinary and plain meaning. Martinez v. 
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Idaho Counties Reciprocal Management Program, 134 Idaho 247,254,999 P.2d 902,909 
(2000). The word "condition" is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as "something 
essential to the ... occurrence of something else : PREREQUISITE," or "a restricting or 
modifying factor. ... " See http:!lwww.m-w.com/dictionarylcondition. Accordingly, the four 
"Conditions for Withdrawal" in Section 6.1 are "essential to the ... occurrence of" withdrawal 
by SARMC, or are "restricting or modifying factor[s]" for withdrawal by SARMC. Thus, 
SARMC's assertion that the conditions are not restrictive is inconsistent with the ordinary 
meaning of the word "Conditions." 
SARMC's interpretation that Section 6.1 "is entirely permissive;" that it "is not an 'express' 
limitation of any sort" also contradicts the plain meaning of the word "if' in that section's 
statement that withdrawal by SARMC is permitted "if' one of the four "Conditions for 
Withdrawal" are present. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word "if' is "in the event that" 
or "on condition that." See http://www.m-w.com/dictionarylif. Thus, by including the word "if' 
in Section 6.1, the parties unambiguously agreed that SARMC could withdraw from MRIA "in 
the event that" or "on the condition that" one of the four expressly stated conditions in Section 
6.1 was present. None of the conditions existed at the time SARMC withdrew. 
Finally, the statement in Section 6. I that SARMC "may" withdraw if one of the four conditions 
is present does not, as suggested by SARMC, render the four "Conditions for Withdraw" 
nonexclusive. As the trial court recognized, "the use of the word 'may' merely entitles the 
Hospital Partners to dissociate for the four (4) reasons in Section 6.1, but does not require those 
partners to dissociate upon the happening of the listed events." (R. Vol. II at 393-94). The word 
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in no way changes the interpretation of"if." Simply put, under the plain meaning of the words in 
Section 6.1, SARMC "may" withdraw "if' one of the four circumstances is present, but SARMC 
is not required to withdraw if one of those circumstances is present. 
2. SARMC's Permissive Grant Interpretation Is Not Supported by 
Statutory Law or the MRIA Partnership Agreement. 
The keystone of SARMC's entire argument is its erroneous assertion that Section 6.1 was 
intended as a permissive provision allowing the hospital partners to withdraw without triggering 
the dissolution of the partnership. Because there is nothirig in the plain language of Section 6.1 
or the evidence to support SARMC's interpretation, SARMC, instead, improperly attempted to 
manufacture the intent of the parties from a strained reading of the Uniform Partnership Act 
("UPA"). I.C. § 53-301 et seq. (repealed effective July I, 2001). 
That SARMC relies on the UPA to manufacture the intent of the parties is amazing given that 
SARMC recognized that RUPA now controls and that if, after RUP A, the language needed to be 
changed to keep the parties intent under the UPA, the parties should have changed the language 
during the grace period. Consequently, the UPA and any context it gives to the parties' intent is 
irrelevant. Section 6.1 must be read only in the context ofRUPA. LC. 53-3-1204(b). As noted 
above, Section 6.1 is entirely limiting. Thus, regardless of how that section read under the UPA, 
under RUPA, the language which SARMC admits is unambiguous, limits the circumstances 
under which SARMC could dissociate. Therefore, even if SARMC's interpretation that Section 
6.1 was meant to allow a hospital to withdraw without causing dissolution under the UP A was 
accurate, RUP A changed the interpretation. 
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SARMC's argument also is wrreasonable because as the trial court properly found, 
even viewed in the context of the UP A, this section did not grant any rights to the Hospital 
Partners that were not already available under the UPA. Under the UPA (like the RUPA), 
the Hospital Partners had the power to leave the partnership at any time, but the 
partnership agreement could still limit the partners' ability to leave and dissolve the 
partnership rightfully. (R. Vol. II. p. 394 (emphasis in original).) 
3. SARMC's Current Interpretation Conflicts With Its Prior Interpretation. 
Although SARMC's interpretation of Section 6.1 was an issue at trial due to SARMC's 
assertion that it acted in good faith when dissociating, SARMC never offered any testimony to 
show that Section 6.1 operated as a permissive grant of authority to dissociate. In fact, even 
SARMC witnesses uniformly testified that Section 6.1 was restrictive. SARMC's CEO, Sandra 
Bruce, testified she understood that Section 6.1 of the MRIA partnership agreement operated as a 
restriction on the ability of the hospital partners to withdraw from the partnership. (TR Vol. II at 
1828:9-19, 1950:9-15.) SARMC's former COO, Cindy Schamp, testified that it would be a 
breach of the agreement to withdraw other than for the four listed reasons. (Id. at 2295:20-
2297:4.) Additionally, SARMC's hired consultant, Alan Hahn, interpreted Section 6.1 to be a 
restriction on SARMC's right to withdraw. (Exhibit 4138 at 16.)15 
In conclusion, drawing all inferences in favor of SARMC, SARMC's "dissociation from 
MRIA was wrongful as a matter of law because the restriction [on SARMC's right to withdraw] 
contained in Section 6. I was clearly and unequivocally expressed" and it was undisputed that 
15 SARMC's conduct also demonstrates that SARMC did not really believe it could dissociate 
without incurring liability. As set forth in Part I supra, SARMC behaved in a manner consistent 
with the perspective that it could not simply withdraw in order to rightfully exit the partnership. 
(Trial Ex. 4138 at 16.) 
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SARMC did not withdraw under any of the four circumstances permitted in Section 6.1. (R. Vol. 
III at 544, R. Vol. II at 395-96.) 
C. SARMC's Dissociation also was Wrongful Because SARMC Dissociated Before 
the End of the Partnership Term. 
Dissociation is also wrongful ifit occurs before the end of the partnership term. LC.§ 53-3-
602(b). SARMC did not appeal the jury's findings that the MRIA partnership was for a definite 
term and that SARMC wrongfully dissociated before the expiration of the term. Instead, 
SARMC argues the trial court erred in submitting this claim to the jury because the trial court 
should have found as a matter of law that the partnership was not for a definite term. SARMC, 
however, waived this argument. Frontier Fed Sav. & Loan v. Douglass, 123 Idaho 808,812, 
853 P.2d 553, 557 (1993). The trial court never ruled on SARMC's motion on this issue (R. Vol. 
II at 341-42, 384-406) and SARMC failed to raise the issue again. 
1. The Court Properly Recognized that Partnership Term was Determined 
from the Entirety of the Agreements That Made Up MRIA's Business 
RUPA recognizes that "[w]hether there exists an agreed term or undertaking for a given 
partnership cannot always be resolved by reference to the written partnership agreement." 
RUPA, § 602, Authors' Comments 5.a. The existence ofa "term" partnership requires 
consideration of documents, conduct and statements outside the formal partnership agreement. 
Id.; see also Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Ky. 2006) ("[I]fthe partnership has for its 
object ... the conduct of a business which obviously continues through a particular season, it 
will be presumed that the parties intended the relationship should continue until the object had 
been accomplished."); Haines v. City of New York, 396 N.Y.S.2d 155, 157 (N.Y. 1977) (holding 
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when there is no express term, courts may "supply the missing term if a duration may be fairly 
and reasonably fixed by the surrounding circumstances and the parties' intent"); Hooker 
Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 587, 
589 (N.Y.A.D. 1982) (same). 
2. The MRIA Partnership Had a Definite Term 
Here, the MRIA partnership had for its object the conduct of certain businesses, the limited 
partnerships. The expressly stated purpose of MRIA was to "organize and promote an Idaho 
limited partnership" and to operate and manage medical diagnostic devices, including a magnetic 
resonance imaging device through the limited partnership. (Trial Ex. 4023 at § 1.6.) MRIA 
managed the business and affairs of MRI CI and later MRIM as their general partner. (Id. at 
1316:5-16; Trial Exs. 4024 at§ 4.1, 4028 at§ 4.1.) During the relevant time of this dispute, 
MRIA conducted no other business. (TR Vol. II at 1326:12-1328:3.) Accordingly, MRIA's 
existence is inextricably intertwined with the limited partnerships it managed. 
As to term, Section I. I of the MRIA Agreement, entitled "Effective Date and Term," provides 
that if the limited partnerships are not formed by December 31, 1985, MRIA will end on that 
date. (Id. at§ I.I.I). In tum, subsection 1.1.2 provides that if the limited partnerships are 
formed, the MRIA shall end when the business of the partnership is completed. (Id. at§ 1.1.2.) 
That business, as set forth above, is the management and operation of the limited partnerships. 
(Id. at§§ I.I, 1.6, 2.1; Trial Exs. 4024 at§ 4.1, 4028 at§ 4.1.) The duration of that business 
therefore can be only for as long as the duration of the limited partnerships. 
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The limited partnerships are for an express term. The agreement for MRICI provides "[t)he 
partnership shall continue from the effective date through December 31, 2015." (Trial Ex. 4024 
at § 1.1.) 16 MRICI' s term was later amended by a vote of the general partners and extended until 
December 31, 2023. (R., Ex. 222, Ex. VV; see infra. Part IV.H.4.) That MRIA's term is 
coextensive with its limited partnerships is also reflected in SARMC board minutes wherein 
SARMC ratified the extension of"the term of the MRI partnership agreement to 12/31/23." 
(Trial Ex. 4109; TR Vol. III at 3521:7-21, 3534:11-18.) SARMC's former COO, who during the 
relevant time was a member of the MRIA board of partners, agreed that the term ofMRIA was 
extended to 2023. (TR Vol. III at 3591:22-3592:21.) 
Accordingly, the MRIA partnership agreement demonstrates that the parties intended the term 
of MRIA to be coextensive with the term of the limited partnerships. Therefore, the court did not 
err in submitting the case to the jury because "drawing every legitimate inference most favorably 
to [MRIA], there exists substantial evidence" indicating (1) MRIA and the limited partnerships 
had terms that expired no earlier than December 31, 2023 and (2) SARMC dissociated before the 
expiration of the term. Powers v. American Honda Motor Co., 139 Idaho 333,335, 79 P.3d 154, 
156 (2003). 
D. The Jury Was Not "Prejudiced" by the Summary Judgment Ruling 
SARMC argues the trial court's summary judgment ruling prevented SARMC from obtaining a 
fair trial on MRIA's other claims. Notwithstanding the erroneous assumption that the ruling was 
16 The agreement for MRIM provides that "[t)he partnership shall continue from the effective 
date through December 31, 2015." (Trial Ex. 4028 at§ I. 1.) 
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improper, the ruling had to be communicated to the jury because the amount of damages due to 
wrongful dissociation was still a jury question. 
Furthermore, SARMC cannot show the trial court's denial of a new trial on its taint accusation 
was a manifest abuse of discretion. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 626, 603 P.2d 575, 581 
(1979). The trial court was under the obligation to determine whether the verdict was rendered 
under "the influence of passion or prejudice." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 
1187, 1196 ( 1986) ( emphasis added). Recognizing this obligation, the trial court found there was 
no prejudice and "allow[ed] the jury's findings to stand because the jury heard substantial 
evidence as to the claims for relief and the damages." (R. Vol. XIII at 2434-35.) 
1. The Summary Judgment Ruling Was Not the Centerpiece of MRIA's 
Case. 
MRIA did not make the ruling the centerpiece of its case because, as found by the trial court 
when ruling on SARMC's motion for a new trial, 17 the evidence was "overwhelming" and "clear 
and convincing" that "the executive management team at Saint Alphonsus really blatantly 
ignored the partnership rights of a partner. . . . It was demonstrated to th[ e] jury that Saint 
Alphonsus chose to compete directly/indirectly with a partner." (TR Vol. III at 4471 :9-17.) 
The centerpiece ofMRIA's case was that SARMC violated its fiduciary duties and partner 
obligations by competing with MRIA through IMI even before it wrongfully dissociated from 
MRIA. The evidence showed that SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA and with knowledge 
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that it would be wrongful to do so, deliberately joined forces with MRIA's competitor, IMI, and 
provided IMI with substantial sums of money, financing, IT support, marketing and management 
expertise which caused MRIA's customers to migrate to SARMC's new joint venture, IMI. (See 
supra Part I, E-K.) If anything swayed the jury against SARMC, it was the sheer volume of 
evidence demonstrating SARMC's deliberate and malicious conduct which virtually destroyed 
MRIA. (Id) As SARMC's CEO stated "I was a partner with a competitor. I was supporting 
myself." (Id. at 1871:8-9.) 
2. SARMC Failed to Satisfy Its Burden to Show Prejudicial Error. 
SARMC has the burden to show more than that the summary judgment ruling was in error; it 
must show prejudicial error as "[p]rejudice will not be presumed on appeal." Pacheco v. Safeco 
Ins. Co. of America, 116 ldaho 794, 798, 780P.2d116, 120 (1989); see also I.R.C.P. 61. To 
show the alleged error was prejudicial, SARMC must demonstrate that but for the wrongful 
dissociation ruling, the jury would not have returned a verdict in favor ofMRIA on MRIA's 
other claims. Ernst v. Hemenway and Moser Co., Inc., 126 Idaho 980, 986, 895 P.2d 581, 587 
(1995). In other words, SARMC must show the jury's verdict on MRIA's other claims is not 
supported by substantial evidence. SARMC, however, did not even attempt to make such a 
showing. In fact, it did not appeal the jury's determination that SARMC was liable for breach of 
fiduciary duty, breach of the non-compete clause, breach of the covenant of good faith, 
conspiracy and intentional interference, because there was overwhelming evidence supporting 
17 Under Idaho Jaw, when ruling on a motion for new trial, the trial court sits as a "thirteenth 
juror" and weighs the evidence to determine whether the jury verdict should be overturned. 
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the jury's verdict on these claims. Therefore, the jury's verdict must be affirmed because 
SARMC did not demonstrate that but for the wrongful dissociation ruling, the jury would not 
have returned a verdict in favor ofMRIA. 
3. It Was Not Error to Refer to SARMC's Dissociation as "Wrongful." 
SARMC claims it was prejudiced because the jury was instructed that the dissociation was 
wrongful and because SARMC allegedly was prohibited from clarifying the ruling's import. It 
was not error for the trial court to instruct the jury that the dissociation was "wrongful." 
Moreover, SARMC was allowed to clarify the ruling's import. 18 
This Court has held on numerous occasions that it is not error to use the words of a statute 
when instructing the jury. See State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 362, 690 P.2d 293, 297 (1984); 
Hollandv. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728,518 P.2d 1190 (1974). Thus, because RUPA expressly refers 
to dissociation in violation of a partnership agreement as "wrongful," the trial court did not err 
by referring to SARMC's dissociation as "wrongful." To insure, however, there would be no 
prejudice to SARMC, the trial court prohibited MRIA from referring to the withdrawal at trial as 
"unlawful," "illegal," or a "violation of law" (R. Vol. XI, p. 2123.) 
Moreover SARMC was allowed to explain to the jury that a "wrongful dissociation is not 
necessarily illegal or blameworthy." In his mini-opening statement to the voir dire panel, 
SARMC's counsel stated "the judge will tell you, I believe, however, that that breach of contract 
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620,624,603 P.2d 575,579 (1979). 
18 SARMC also alleges that the supposed prejudice to SARMC was exacerbated by the 
admission of evidence that SARMC had been advised it did not have the right to withdraw. (Id 
at 29, n. 8.) As set forth in Part IV. H-I infra., admission of that evidence was proper. 
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was not unlawful. Despite the fact that we might be referring to it from time to time as a 
'wrongful' move, it was not unlawful." (TR Vol. I at 620:10-13 (emphasis added).) SARMC's 
CEO likewise testified that SARMC was allowed to withdraw under RUPA. (TR Vol. II at 
1949:15-19.) In closing statements SARMC then argued "[w]e had the right to leave the 
partnership." (TR Vol. III at 4371 :20.) Thus, SARMC was allowed to explain it had a right to 
dissociate and even that the dissociation was "not unlawful." 
4. The Trial Court's Instruction Concerning SARMC's Wrongful 
Dissociation Did Not "Amount to a Directed Verdict" on MRIA's Other 
Claims. 
SARMC attempts to stretch its "taint" argument by averring that the trial court's instruction to 
the jury on wrongful dissociation "amounted to a directed verdict on critical elements of the 
remaining claims." Notwithstanding that this argument is pure speculation, the argument also 
has no merit, because there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict on these 
claims. In light of this "overwhelming" and "clear and convincing" evidence, it cannot be said 
the instructions to the jury about the summary judgment finding of wrongful dissociation 
"tainted" thejury. 19 (TR Vol. III at4471:9-17.) 
Furthermore, it was SARMC's counsel, in closing argument, who exacerbated the alleged 
problem by repeatedly referring to SARMC's dissociation as a "bad act." 
I want to talk about dissociation because that's the one where, obviously, even though we 
didn't think we were committing a bad act at the time we did it, we later found out that it 
wasn't something that we should have done. We had the right to leave the partnership, but 
the way in which we left it was a wrongful dissociation. Of course, that's a bad act when 
19 Conspicuously, SARMC does not cite to any objection to the instructions on this ground. 
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we -- we now have to accept the fact that it's a bad act. Certainly, in this room it's a bad act. 
You didn't think it was a bad act, but it's a bad act in this room. 
(TR Vol. III at 4371: 16-25 (emphasis added).) Neither MRIA nor the trial court referred to the 
dissociation as a "bad act." Thus, if any statement "compelled" the jury to find for MRIA on 
MRIA's other claims, it was SARMC's repeated reference to its "bad act" in closing arguments. 
SARMC cannot claim prejudice from its own conduct. 
In conclusion, there is nothing in the jury's conduct or in its apparent decision making process 
suggesting the jury was impassioned or prejudiced by the summary judgment ruling when it 
determined liability on MRIA's other claims. To the contrary, the jury appears to have been very 
deliberate in reaching its decision. The jury's verdict was then upheld by the trial court, which 
after an independent review, denied SARMC's request for a new trial. SARMC's new request 
must be denied as SARMC has failed to show manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
E. The Jury's Damages Award must be Affirmed Because MRIA Had Standing to 
Bring the Claims. 
The Jury's damages award must be affirmed because (1) SARMC failed to argue below that 
MRIA is not entitled to recover lost profits and (2) all of the claims, not just the fiduciary duty 
claims, were brought on behalf of the limited partnerships. 
1. SARMC Failed to Preserve Its Argument. 
SARMC's claim that the verdict form was flawed because of the disjunctive nature of Question 
No. 9 20 is premised on SARMC's erroneous assumption that MRIA is not entitled to recover lost 
20 The Court should not consider SARMC's argument because SARMC failed to preserve it for 
appeal. Although SARMC provided the trial court with a proposed special verdict form which 
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profits. SARMC never took this position below. SARMC: 
• Never sought a ruling that lost profit damages were not recoverable by MRIA; 
• Agreed in the jury instruction conferences that MRIA was "entitled to pursue" lost 
profits (TR Vol. III at 3372:1-8; 3374:5-8); 
• Implicitly agreed MRIA could recover lost profit damages by submitting jury instructions 
aJlowing MRIA to recover lost profit damages (R. Ex. 230, Instructions Nos. 3, 24, 25); and 
• Submitted a special verdict form acknowledging MRIA had standing to seek lost profits. (Id 
at Instruction No. 41). 
Indeed, because SARMC never challenged MRIA's standing to recover lost profits, the trial 
court never ruled on the matter.21 Thus, there is no court order to appeal, and therefore the issue 
was not preserved for appeal. Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547,552, 181 P.3d 473,478 
(2008). 
SARMC's conduct at the jury instruction conferences also unequivocally demonstrates that 
SARMC agreed MRIA could seek lost profits because it was making claims on behalf of the 
limited partnerships as weH as its own behaJf. SARMC never objected to the instructions or to 
the verdict form on the grounds that MRIA is not entitled to damages for the lost scans suffered 
separated the claims of MRIA from those of MRI Center and MRI Mobile, (Exhibit to R. No. 
230, Instruction No. 41, Question Nos. 6, 8, 9), it did not object to the special verdict form or 
Question No. 9 on the record below. (See TR Vol. III at 3334-80, 3962-70, 4181-97, 4199-
4206). Further, SARMC did not support its arguments on this issue with any legal authority. As 
stated by this Court, "[a] party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is 
lacking." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263,923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
21 That SARMC never raised this issue below is highlighted by the fact that the radiologists, who 
were third-party defendants, did raise the issue in a motion for summary judgment. (R., Ex. 59.) 
SARMC did not join in the motion or file a similar motion. When the radiologists subsequently 
withdrew their motion before a decision was rendered, SARMC did not object to the withdrawal 
of the motion. Because the motion was withdrawn, the issue was never before the trial court for 
decision. (R. Vol.Vat 873~874.) SARMC cannot resurrect the radiologists' withdrawn motion 
on appeal. 
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by its limited partners. Instead, SARMC agreed MRIA could seek lost profits. Its counsel, 
Patrick Miller, stated: 
On No. 35, paragraph 1 -- it may be a little confusing to the jury because they have 
presented evidence oflost profits, and I would think that what we ought to do is say that 
MRIA's, you know, lost profits -- I think we ought to say that they are entitled to pursue 
what they think is their lost profits. They have put on damage of that through Mr. Budge 
and Mr. Wilhoite. And then, we think we ought to have the instruction that we asked for 
that when you ask for Jost profits, you've got to prove them both as to amount and 
causation with reasonable certainty. So, I suggest paragraph I that it's -- that they're 
entitled to claim net lost profits, but then the measure can be dropped off because their 
proof takes care of that. 
(TR Vol. Ill at 3372:1-14 (emphasis added).) SARMC also submitted jury instructions and a 
verdict form recognizing MRIA could recover lost profits on behalf of the enterprise, which 
includes the limited partnerships, MRICI and MRIM. (K Ex. 230, Instructions Nos. 3, 24, 25, 
and 41.) The trial court likewise agreed for purpose of the jury instructions and the verdict form 
that, other than wrongful dissociation, the damages for all of the claims is the same: lost profits. 
(TR Vol. III at 3962: 15-3970:22.) 
The fact is that SARMC never argued MRIA is not entitled to damages on behalf of itself or on 
behalf of the limited partners because, SARMC, like the court and everyone else, treated MRIA 
and its limited partners as a single enterprise. (See also TR Vol. III at 4202:20-4203:4.) MRIA 
was the management head and MRICI and MRIM were the operational divisions of the business. 
(TR Vol. II at 1316:3-19.) One could not function without the other. This integrated nature of the 
entities was succinctly stated by the trial court. 
And when I say "these folks," I'm talking about, really, MRI Mobile/MRI Center were 
interwoven with MRIA, though there were distinctions and they may have been for tax 
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purposes or other health-law purposes, the overwhelming evidence is that they were all 
bundled together and decisions were made. 
And so, the court will decline to differentiate between or give separate instructions as to 
MRIA and then MRI Mobile and MRI Center, the limited liability partnerships. 
(TR Vol. III at 4202:24-4203:4; 4203:18-21 (emphasis added).) Because of this "bundling," any 
injury to the operations groups (MRICI and MRIM) are recoverable by the board (MRIA) in the 
form of lost profits. 22 
2. MRIA Was Authorized to Bring the Limited Partners' Claims. 
The partnership agreements for MRICI and MRIM provide "[t]he business and affairs of the 
Partnership shall be conducted by the General Partner, [MRIA,] which is vested with all 
authority and responsibility necessary for the management of the Partnership and its business ... 
. "(Trial Ex. 4024 at§ 4.1 and Ex. 4028 at§ 4.1.) The business and affairs of the limited 
partnerships necessarily includes lawsuits. 
3. MRIA Brought All of the Claims on Behalf of the Limited Partnerships 
Contrary to SARMC's assertion, all of the claims were brought by MRIA on behalf ofMRICI 
and MRIM, not just the breach of fiduciary duty claim.23 This is made clear by the second 
amended counterclaim which provides: 
22 The concept that damage to the limited partnerships constituted damage to MRIA is also 
memorialized in the MRIA partnership agreement, which states that partners could not engage in 
competitive activity within l 00 miles "of the first magnetic resonance imaging device installed 
by the Limited Partnership," referring to the MRI Center facility. (Trial Ex. 4023, § 9.2.2.) Thus, 
any damages suffered by the MRIA partners for a violation of the non-compete agreement was 
clearly intended by the parties to be measured by the damages to the limited partnerships. (TR 
Vol. II at 1316:3s19; 1327:10-15.) 
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MRI Associates, LLP is an Idaho limited liability partnership ("MRIA"), which also acted 
as a general partner with management responsibilities for two operational entities, MRI 
Limited Partnership, known as MRI Center of Idaho ("MRI Center" or the "Center"), and 
MRI Mobile Limited Partnership, known as MRI Mobile. MRIA brings this action on its 
own behalf, and as general partner for these operational entities; MRIA is entitled to and 
does hereby bring this action on behalf of these two limited partnerships. Unless otherwise 
referenced, the designation "MRIA" shall refer to all three entities: MRIA, MRI Center 
and MRI Mobile. 
(R. Vol.Vat 907, ,i 7 (emphasis added).) Thus, MRIA brought the action on its own behalf and 
on behalf of the limited partnerships. MRIA also made clear that when "MRIA" was used in the 
counterclaim, it referred to MRIA and the limited partnerships. (Id.) The final jury instructions 
also recognized that the parties and the trial court were treating MRIA and its limited 
partnerships as one operational unit for purposes of the claims. For example, Instruction No. 33 
provides that if the jury finds that SARMC breached its duty of loyalty "to MRIA, MRI Center, 
or MRI Mobile, then your verdict should be for MRIA." (R. Ex. 202.) Because all of the claims, 
except the fiduciary duty claims, were made by MRIA on behalf of MRI CI and MRIM, and 
because the jury found for MRIA on all of those claims the jury's damage award must stand 
regardless of whether SARMC owed fiduciary duties to the limited partnerships, MRICI and 
MRIM. (R. Vol.Vat 929-30, 932-34, 940; R. Vol. XII at 2294-96.) 
Furthermore, SARMC's own proposed instructions, which recognized MRIA was bringing the 
claims on behalf of the limited partnerships as well as its own behalf, reveal that this argument 
23 Unlike all of the other claims, the breach of fiduciary duty claims were segregated between 
MRIA and the limited partnerships. Instead one claim was brought by MRIA on its own behalf 
and another claim was brought by MRIA on behalf of the limited partnerships. (R. Vol. V at 930-
31.) This was done because MRIA recognized that separate duties were owed by SARMC to 
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was newly manufactured for appeal. For example, SARMC's proposed Jury Instruction No. 24 
asserts that: "MRI Associates has alleged causes of action for ... breach of fiduciary duty to 
MRI Limited and MRI Mobile .... " (R. Ex. 230, Instructions No. 24.) SARMC also invited any 
error when it successfully argued for one damage line on the verdict form. (TR Vol. III at 
3968:7-3969:6.) It would have made no difference to have separate questions concerning 
whether the jury was finding for MRIA or one of the limited partnerships with respect to the 
fiduciary duty claims because if the jury found on behalf ofMRIA for tortious interference, 
which it did, and on behalf of the limited partnerships for breach of fiduciary duty, there would 
be no way to distinguish to whom the damages were awarded. This invited error by SARMC 
destroys SARMC's argument that the verdict form was defective. Burgess v. Salmon River 
Canal Co. Ltd, 127 Idaho 565,571,903 P.2d 730, 736 (1995). 
4. SARMC Owed Fiduciary Duties MRICI and MRIM. 
Because MRIA clearly brought all of the claims on behalf of the limited partnerships, not just 
the fiduciary duty claims, and because SARMC has not appealed the jury's finding ofliability on 
these other claims, this Court need not address whether SARMC owed fiduciary duties to the 
limited partnerships to sustain the verdict and damages award. However, even if the Court were 
to find damages could be awarded to MRICI and MRIM only upon their breach of fiduciary duty 
claims, the award is proper. 
each entity. Because there were distinctly separate fiduciary duty claims, Instruction No.7 makes 
clear that the limited partners are distinct entities. (R. Exhibit 202, Instruction No. 17.) 
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A fiduciary relation exists between two parties when one is under a duty to act or to give 
advice for the benefit of the other upon a matter within the scope of the relation. Podolan v. 
Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,946,854 P.2d 280,289 (Ct. App. 1993). "To 
establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff must establish that defendants owed 
plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was breached." Sorensen v. Saint 
AlphonsusRegional Medical Center, Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 760, 118 P.3d 86, 92 (2005). 
a. SARMC Owed Fiduciary Duties to MRICI and MRIM 
Pursuant to Statute 
The Court should find, contrary to the trial court's holding below, (R. Vol. X at 1876-77), that 
SARMC owed fiduciary duties to MRICI and MRIM pursuant to statute.24 Fiduciary 
relationships can be created by statute, including the Idaho Uniform Partnership Act, LC. § 53-3-
404(a)-(c), which provides partners owe fiduciary duties to the partnership. These statutory 
duties flow from SARMC to both MRIA and the limited partnerships.25 
SARMC, however, attempts to make several artificial distinctions between SARMC as a 
general partner of MRIA and MRIA itself. Of course, "[ e Jach partner is an agent of the 
24 Although this is a cross-appeal issue, it is addressed here as it concerns the fiduciary duty 
claims. 
25 SARMC emphasizes this language from the comments to§ 53-3-404: "[aJrguably, the term 
'fiduciary' is inappropriate when used to describe the duties of a partner because a partner may 
legitimately pursue self-interest ... and not solely the interest of the partnership and the other 
partners, as must a true trustee.25" Id. at comment I. However, the same comment acknowledges 
that the characterization of partners as fiduciaries is a long-standing practice, and that "the law of 
partnership reflects the broader Jaw of principal and agent, under which every agent is a 
fiduciary." Id. 
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partnership for the purpose of its business" and "[ a]n act of a partner ... binds the partnership." 
Idaho Code§ 53-3-301. Consistent with this fundamental rule, "all partners are liable jointly and 
severally for all obligations of the partnership." Id. at§ 53-3-306. Through these and other rules, 
Idaho law merges partnerships and their general partners into a single legal identity. Thus, if a 
partnership such as MRIA was a fiduciary to the entities it operated, MRI CI and MRIM, then the 
general partners ofMRIA are also fiduciaries to MRICI and MRIM. 
SARMC's argument that it was not a fiduciary to MRICI and MRIM would render Idaho 
partnership law incoherent. A partnership such as MRIA would be unable to observe its fiduciary 
duties to the businesses it operates if its own general partners (who have the power to bind 
MRIA as its agents) were not obligated to observe the same fiduciary duties. Moreover, as the 
joint and several liability rule indicates, there is no "partnership veil" that relieves a general 
partner from answering for the partnership's debts and obligations. Thus, there is no distinction 
between MRIA's obligations and the obligations ofMRIA's general partners. 
In re The Monetary Group, 2 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1993), reached a similar conclusion: 
A general partner in a limited partnership stands in a fiduciary relationship with the limited 
partners of that limited partnership. Atkins was a general partner of TSO. Thus, Atkins 
owed a fiduciary duty to TSG's limited partners. Additionally, TSO was a general partner 
of Groups. Therefore, because Atkins owed a fiduciary duty as a general partner of TSG 
and TSO was a general partner of Groups, Atkins' fiduciary duty extended to Groups. 
Id. at 1103 (citations omitted)(applying New York law). The same reasoning applies here: as a 
fiduciary to MRIA, SARMC was also a fiduciary to MRICI and MRIM. 
The artificial distinctions raised by SARMC exalt form over substance. This can be shown by 
the following analogy. The responsibilities of the MRIA board of partners that managed the 
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limited partnerships included functioning much like a board of directors over the limited 
partnerships. SARMC's capacity as a member of the board of partners was much like that ofan 
individual director. Such an individual director owes a fiduciary duty to the businesses it 
manages while sitting on the board. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 138 Idaho 424,428, 64 P.3d 953,957 
(2003). In this light, it makes complete sense to find that SARMC's fiduciary responsibilities run 
not only to MRIA, but also to the partnerships MRIA managed. 26 
b. SARMC Owed Fiduciary Duties to MRI Center and MRI 
Mobile Pursuant to Common Law 
SARMC also was a fiduciary to MRIA, MRICI, and MRIM due to the position of trust and 
confidence it held in relationship to these entities. As this Court has long held, "[a] fiduciary 
relationship does not depend upon some technical relation created by or defined in law, but it 
exists in cases where there has been a special confidence imposed in another who, in equity and 
good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interest of one reposing 
the confidence." Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276,288,240 P.2d 833, 840-41 (1952). Thus, 
"[g]enerally, in a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest or authority of the other is placed 
in the charge of the fiduciary." Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 
277,824 P.2d 841,852 (1991). 
26 SARMC, while citing I.C. § 53-224, asserts that "the Limited Partnership Act makes clear that 
only MRIA, as general partner, and not Saint Alphonsus, as a limited partner, owed fiduciary 
duties to [MRICI and MRIM]." That code section, however, does not support SARMC's 
argument. It simply provides that a general partner owes the same duties in a limited partnership 
that a partner owes in a general partnership. Thus it is completely consistent with MRIA's 
arguments above. 
39 
SARMC argues that because it held only two of the seats on the MRIA Board of Partners, no 
reasonable jury could conclude that SARMC had authority over the limited partnerships. 
SARMC again ignores the totality of the evidence.27 As the trial court found, the evidence left 
no doubt that SARMC exercised influence and authority over MRICI and MRIM. 
The court had, from the significant number of minute meetings and -- or minutes 
from meetings and the substantial role, I believe, Saint Alphonsus played in their 
partnership with MRIA, that realistic- -- the evidence -- and I haven't really heard any 
evidence to the contrary -- that there was a confidence placed by these folks. And when I 
say "these folks," I'm talking about, really, MRI Mobile/MRI Center were interwoven with 
MRIA, though there were distinctions and they may have been for tax purposes or other 
health-law purposes, the overwhelming evidence is that they were all bundled together and 
decisions were made .... 
They [SARMC] were voting. They were acting as a fiduciary. And certainly, 
there is, I believe, clear evidence and, really, no contradictory evidence to that effect. ... 
I think MRIA had a very, very reasonable reliance on the trust and belief that 
Saint Alphonsus was acting in a fiduciary capacity towards both MRIA, MRI 
Mobile/MRI Center in their limited partnership capacities. 
(TR. Vol. III at 4202: 12-4203: I 8 (emphasis added).) Similarly in Matter of Bennett, 989 F.2d 
779, 788 (5th Cir. 1993), the court held that "as the managing partner of the managing partner, 
[Bennett] owed to the MG limited partners 'the highest fiduciary duty recognized in the law."' 
27 SARMC was the 800 pound gorilla in the relationship. The business depended on SARMC's 
involvement. (Id. at 2420:10-16.) MRICI's magnet was sited on SARMC's campus. (TR Vol. II 
at 1325:21-1326:11; 1860:6-15.) SARMC had the relationship with the referring doctors and the 
radiologists that read the scans. (TR Vol. II at 2420:11-16; 2020:7-18; 2428:21-2429:6; Trial 
Exs. 4329 at 2, 4505 at 1, & 4221 at 3.) SARMC sat on the board of partners, voted on matters 
and exercised influence over the limited partnerships. (See e.g., Trial Exs. 4054 at 2 & 4221 at 3; 
TR Vol. II at 1881:8-24.) In fact, SARMC was entrusted to negotiate with the radiologists so the 
radiologists would join MRIA rather than compete against MRICI. (See supra., Part I. F.) The 
other partners gave SARMC a tremendous amount of deference and acceded to SARMC's 
wishes even when doing so was not optimal for the partnership. (TR Vol. III at 3314:2-5; 
3311 :5-3315: 15; 1171: 14-1! 72:2.) In fact, SARMC was so valuable to the partnership, that after 
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Id. at 790. See also Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex.Civ.App. 1981) (holding 
the general partner of a partnership that was itself the general partner of a limited partnership 
owed the limited partnership fiduciary duties). To hold otherwise would invite attempts by such 
"second-tier" general partners to evade partnership duties and liability by simply adding a second 
partnership layer. See In re Abrams, 229 B.R. 784, 792 (9th Cir. B. App. 1999). 
SARMC's argument would render the fiduciary duties ofMRIA's partners absolutely 
meaningless.28 Those partners indisputably owe MRIA fiduciary duties and MRIA as the general 
partner of the limited partnerships indisputably owes fiduciary duties to those partnerships. 
Surely Idaho partnership law also imposes on general partners such as SARMC fiduciary duties 
for the benefit of entities in the position of MRI CI and MRIM. Accordingly, the jury's verdict 
should be sustained. 
F. The Jury's Finding of Causation Must be Affirmed. 
SARMC contends the jury's finding of causation must be overturned because MRIA did not 
"isolate" the effect of (GSR) IMI's entry into the competitive market (i.e, it was the reputation of 
the radiologists in IMI that caused the referral migration). This contention fails because SARMC, 
as a co-conspirator,joint venturer and partner with GSR in IM!, is liable for GSR's conduct in 
IMI. This contention also fails because even if MRIA was required to isolate the effect of GSR in 
!MI, MRIA proved with reasonable certainty that SARMC caused the claimed damage. 
it dissociated, MRICI "struggl[ed] with how to stay in business." (TR Vol. II at 1301:19-
1302:1.) 
28 In fact, SARMC's counsel thought SARMC's withdrawal created a risk of SARMC 
"breaching its fiduciary duties to the LPs." (Trial Ex. 4239 at 11.) 
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1. SARMC Is Liable for the Conduct of the Radiologists in IMI 
SARMC's argument that MRIA needed to isolate the effect ofIMI is not a causation argument, 
but instead is a liability argument as SARMC is really asserting it is not liable for the conduct of 
GSR, its partner in IMI. This argument fails because there is no dispute that SARMC is liable 
for the conduct of GSR in IMI. The jury found that SARMC conspired with GSR to compete 
with MRIA through IMI, a finding that SARMC has not appealed. (R. Ex. 202 at Instruction 36, 
R. Vol. XII at 2296.) Thus, regardless of whether it was SARMC's conduct or GSR's conduct in 
IMI that caused MRIA damage, SARMC is liable as a co-conspirator. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. 
White, 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d 964, 966 (1963). Therefore, because SARMC has not 
disputed that MRIA proved $36.3 million dollars of the scans were lost to IMI, and because 
SARMC did not appeal the conspiracy finding, SARMC's argument must be rejected and the 
damages award must be affirmed. 
Even without the conspiracy finding, SARMC's argument fails because it was IMI's entry into 
the market with SARMC's support that caused MRIA damage. There is no dispute that had 
SARMC opened a competing business on its own, it would be liable for the scans MRIA lost to 
that business. Vancil v. Anderson, 71 Idaho 95, 105,227 P.2d 74, 79 (1951). It is no defense that 
here, SARMC did so as a partner in IMI because SARMC is jointly and severally liable for 
GSR's acts in the IMI partnership. LC. § 53-3-306. SARMC is even liable for the acts ofIMI 
before it formally joined IM! because it joint ventured with !MI from the beginning. Costa v. 
Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 356, 179P.3d316, 319 (2008) (recognizing a joint venture "is an 
association of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise" and that 
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"partnership law generally governs joint ventures.") Accordingly, as there is no dispute the scans 
were lost to IM!, the following equation summarizes causation: SARMC + Gem State Radiology 
= IM!. 
2. Even ifSARMC Was Not Liable for the Conduct of its Partner in IMI, 
MRIA Adequately Proved Causation. 
As set forth above, the Court need not address SARMC's causation argument because SARMC 
is liable for the conduct of IM!. However, even if SARMC was not liable as a co-conspirator, 
MRIA proved causation and damages. 
a. MRIA's Burden of Proof Regarding Causation and Damages. 
MRIA had three hurdles to clear in its proof of causation and damages: 
Proximate cause: MRIA's burden was to prove its injury was proximately caused by SARMC's 
conduct. Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 152 P.3d 604 (Idaho 2007). 
Proximate cause is a cause that, in natural or probable sequence produced the claimed damage. 
!DJ! 2.30.2. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing 
about the loss. Id 
The fact of damage: MRIA must prove with "reasonable certainty" that the alleged conduct 
did, in fact, damage MRIA. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 61 I. "Reasonable certainty 
requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude; rather, the evidence need only 
be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from the realm of speculation." Id. The fact of 
damage can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. San 
Tan Ranches, 102 Idaho 567,570,633 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Idaho 1981). 
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The amount of damage: The amount of damages must be "proved with whatever definiteness 
and accuracy the facts pennit, but no more." Id at 741, 152 P.3d at 612. Ultimately it is for the 
trier of fact to fix the amount by determining the credibility of the witnesses, resolving conflicts 
in the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. Id at 741, l52 P.3d at 612. 
SARMC, "[t]he wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty [in the proof of the amount of 
damages] which [its] own wrong has created." Id 
b. MRIA Proved SARMC Was a Proximate Cause ofMRIA's 
Loss. 
i. A Probable and Foreseeable Consequence of SARMC's 
Conduct was that Scans Would Migrate from MRIA to IMI. 
The evidence shows that SARMC specifically intended to shift scans from MRIA to its new 
joint venture with GSR, IMI. The jury easily could have determined that the following acts by 
SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA, were intended to steer referring physicians from MRIA 
to IMI: 
• SARMC made IMI its "outpatient facility'' for SARMC patients. (See supra Part I. H. 5.) 
• SARMC provided significant IT support and investment to IMI allowing IMI to digitally 
present its images and reports to referring physicians. MRIA was excluded from much of 
this IT support. (See supra Part I. H. 2.) 
• SARMC and GSR jointly marketed IMI directly to referring physicians. (See supra Part I. H. 
4.) 
• SARMC assisted in the management, planning and establishment of IMI Meridian (aka "IMI 
West") which competed with MRICI and MRIM. (See supra Part I. H. 6.) 
• SARMC and the radiologists placed a mobile scanning unit I 00 feet away from MRICI's 
operation on the SARMC campus. (TR Vol. II at 2173:21-24.) 
• SARMC turned a blind eye to GSR's reduction in effort and technician support at MRICI's 
lab. (See supra Part I. I.) 
• SARMC allowed GSR to reduce their weekday hours of service at MRI CI, so that 
radiologists were less available to schedule, attend or read an MRICI scanning procedure. 
(Id) 
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• SARMC allowed GSR to cancel all weekend hours of service to MRIA, except for 
emergencies (previously, service had been 24/7 for emergency and non-emergency cases). 
(Id.) 
• SARMC pulled all affiliation with MRJCI and directed its medical staff to refer patients 
solely to IMI. (Trial Ex. 4377.) 
The reasonable inference is that the natural and probable consequence of this conduct was the 
loss of scan volume at MRICI. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that SARMC took deliberate 
steps to shift scan volumes away from MRICI to IMI.29 
Also, contrary to SARMC's argument, MRIA did not need not show that SARMC was the 
"only cause" of the scan migration. Gr([fith, 143 Idaho at 740-41, 152 P.3d at 611-12. 30 It was 
sufficient for MRJA to show that SARMC was a substantial factor in bringing about the 
migration. IDJI 2.30.2. In addition to the above, the evidence is overwhelming that IMI would 
never have been the competitor it became without SARMC's support and assistance. In fact, the 
29 This intention to compete with its partners in MRJA (i.e., take scan volumes) is reflected in 
the work of SAM C's consultants. SAR.MC CFO, Ken Fry asked A1an Hahn to prepare Scenario 
5 which analyzes the consequences of SARMC competing with MRIA through IMI and warns 
that doing so would cause "shifting referrals" that could result in litigation. (Trial Ex. 4138; TR 
Vol. II at 1864: 1-12; 2297:8-13.) Shattuck Hammond documents also reveal that SARMC was 
"strongly considering withdrawing .... and competing with the existing MRI facilities on its own 
campus" and that SARMC wanted "to continue pursue additional imaging center opportunities 
within its service area through IMI." (Trial Ex. 4247; TR Vol. II at 1861:21-1863:2; 2369:8-
2370:10.) 
30 SARMC's reliance on this Court's decisions in Pope v. Jntermountain Gas, 103 Idaho 217, 
646 P.2d 988 (1982) and Twin Falls Farm & City Distrb., Inc. v. D & B Supply Co., 96 Idaho 
351, 528 P.2d 1286 (1974) is misplaced. Pope and Twin Falls are antitrust cases. For an antitrust 
case, a claimant must show the damages were caused by an antitrust violation, not by other 
factors such as competition. Pope, 103 Idaho at 233-34, 646 P.2d at 1004-05. As set forth 
above, in this case competition was the actionable conduct. See also Vancil v. Anderson, 71 
Idaho 95,105,227 P.2d 74, 79 (1951). 
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evidence demonstrates IMI might not have come into existence without SARMC's assistance. 
(Trial Exs. 545 & 4074.) While still a partner in MRIA: 
• IMI's financing was contingent on SARMC's involvement: (Trial Ex. 545.) 
• SARMC supported the opening ofIMI by providing: (1) records of its case volume to 
IMI to help IMI develop a business plan; (2) knowledgeable staff members who began 
working for GSR in order to establish a functioning business at IMI; (3) IT support and 
connections to SARMC's digital radiology system; and (4) assistance in securing loans 
for the financing ofIMI. (Trial Ex. 4095.) 
• SARMC provided IMI with significant financial support, including $546,146 in cash 
and assumption of$I.5 miIJion ofIMI's debt. (Id at 1557:4-1558:2; 1622:22-1623:8.) 
• SARMC provided IMI with exclusive IT support from IMI's inception including a 
$780,000 investment in dark fiber connecting IMI to SARMC. Basically, SARMC 
"was there with [IMI] making that investment in getting doctors over the technology 
hump" and helping bring the "digital revolution" to IMI while MRIA was left in the 
cold. (See supra Part I. H. 2.) 
SARMC's argument that scans migrated to IMI based on the-professional reputation of the 
radiologists does not change the analysis. The jury was presented with SARMC's evidence and 
argument in this regard, and found, notwithstanding the radfologists' reputation, SARMC was a 
substantial factor in bringing about MRIA's losses~31 The argument, in fact, demonstrates why it 
was so egregious for SARMC to join the radiologists in founding IMI to compete with MRIA.32 
c. The Fact of Injury is Undisputed. 
31 SARMC's argument also misrepresents the testimony at trial. Sam Gibson, one of the referring 
doctors called by SARMC stated he sent his referrals to SARMC. (TR Vol. III at 3328:23-
3329:2.) 
32 The argwnent is simply ofno help to SARMC because the proof is (1) the radiologists' 
reputation and practice was enhanced by continued affiliation with SARMC in IMI, (TR Vol. II 
at 2420: l- l 6)and (2) any act of the radiologists that attracted a migration of scans to IMI was 
done either as a joint venturer, partner or co-conspirator with SARMC. 
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SARMC does not dispute that MRICI lost scan volumes after IMI opened and that the scans 
lost by MRICI migrated to IMI. Trial exhibits 4518 and 4519, charts prepared by MRIA's expert 
Bruce Budge, graphically show that MRIA lost scan volumes while IMI enjoyed a corresponding 
increase in scans. (Ex. B to the Appendix attached hereto.) In his analysis, Budge painstakingly 
identified approximately 1900 doctors who had historically used MRICI, but had shifted their 
business to IML (TR Vol. II at 2745:23-2746:7.) Based on his analysis, Budge testified that 
SARMC's course of conduct "handicapped MRIA to the advantage of one of its partners 
[SARMC] and caused this migration of referrals .... Those scans ... they're not going out in the 
community to some other competitor. They're going to IMI. You can see that from the data. And 
it's not necessary to go and ask the physicians for their detailed information. We can observe 
what that migration is."33 (Id at 2767:25-2768:6 (emphasis added.) 
Moreover the jury was allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the conduct, bullet pointed 
above, to find that the intended consequence of SARMC's conduct had, in fact, caused the 
injury. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 611. It was therefore not unreasonable for the jury 
to infer from the evidence that SARMC's conduct caused MRIA's harm. For example: 
• Carolyn Corbett, SAR.Me's Chief Nursing Officer testified she was "sure" the radiologists 
curtailment of hours at MRICI had a "huge impact" on MRICI's capability to do business. 
(TR Vol. IIat2195:14-17.) 
• Jack Floyd, CEO ofMRICI, presented Ken Fry, SARMC's CFO with a monthly report 
showing the lost scans caused by SARMC's failure to require the radiologists to maintain a 
33 Interestingly, because IMI kept track of its growth by measuring the number of SARMC 
doctors that it was attracting. In the first months of operation, !Mi's MRI customer base 
consisted of74% SARMC doctors. (Trial Exs. 4127, 4517; TR Vol. II at 1512:3-1513:18.) 
IMI's executive director testified that these doctors likely had used MRCI before IMI. (Id at 
I 5 1 7: 12-19.) 
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24/7 schedule at MRICI (as had been required before !MI opened). (Id. at 2509:14-2510:19; 
Trial Ex. 4292.) 
• Holly Wallace, MRICI's marketing director, testified that SARMC was doing marketing on 
behalf of IMI which caused MRIA to lose customers because IMI became known as the 
SARMC affiliated imaging center and she testified that SARMC gave IMI a two year head 
start on technology which delivered digital reports to referring physicians. (TR Vol. II at 
2420: 11-16; 2428:21~2429:6; 2439:7-2440:7.) These activities occurred over a period time 
while MRICI lost scan volumes. (Id. at 2440:8-12.) 
• The IMI Operating Agreement reveals SARMC's agreement with GSR to pursue and 
establish an imaging center in Meridian ("IMI West"). (Trial Ex. 4226.) Cindy Schamp 
acknowledged that SARMC could not, under the terms of the MRIA Partnership Agreement, 
establish an imaging center in Meridian. (Id. at 2266:6-13.) Nevertheless, IMI West, under 
the IMI Managing Committee (consisting of four SARMC executives) took thousands of 
referrals away from MRICI and MRIM each year. (Id. at 2793-94; Trial Ex. 4516) 
• Bruce Budge testified that his analysis of MRI Cl's records and IMI's records established 
that, averaged over a five and a half year period, 52% of the scans performed by IMI at its 
downtown operation were referred by doctors who had historically referred to MRICI. (TR 
Vol. II at 2741 :7-22) MRICI's lost scans were not going to any other competitor in the 
market, than IMI. (TR Vol. II at 2767:25-2768:6, 2748:20-2753:7; Trial Ex. 4518.) 
An analysis of the overwhelming evidence supporting causation in comparison with SARMC's 
sole fact in defense of causation is attached as Ex. C to the Appendix attached hereto. 
d. MRIA Proved the Amount of Damages With Reasonable Certainty 
Because MRIA proved some damage occurred it only needed to prove the amount "with 
whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit[ ed]" because any uncertainty in the amount 
is borne by SARMC as the wrongdoer. Griffith, 143 Idaho at 741, 152.P.3d at 612. 
MRIA's expert, Bruce Budge, testified he obtained information from both MRIA and IMI 
showing the doctors that referred to those imaging centers and the number of referrals from each 
of those doctors. (TR Vol. II at 2730:3-2731:7; 2735:13-21; 2737:9-18; 2738:25-2739:7; Trial 
Bxs. 4417 A; 4425, 4515, 4516, and 4517.) Budge used a conservative analysis; he only took 
into account (1) MRIA's historical customers who had switched to IMI, downtown and 
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Meridian, (2) scans from IMI's mobile unit that SARMC placed next to MRICI on SARMC's 
campus, and (3) new SARMC related physicians, (Id. at 2741:7-2743:6; 2765:4-2766:7.) Based 
on this information he developed an approach which showed revenues were diverted from MRIA 
to IMI. (Id at 2733:5-9). Essentially, he tracked the "migration of referrals" from MRIA to IMI. 
(Id at 2764:5-17; 2767:25-2768:6.) His analysis was consistent with the testimony at trial that 
MRIAlostscanstoIMI. (TR Vol. Hat 1301:24-1302:l; 1365:15-21; 1536:13-19.) 
Budge then used the detailed information he had from both MRIA and IMI concerning their 
revenues and costs per scans to determine how much profit MRIA lost as a result of the 
migration of referrals from MRIA to IMI. (Id. at 2730:3-2731 :7; 2753:17-2754: 16.) "So I 
basically am multiplying the number of scans times the profit per scan to figure out the lost 
profit." (Id at 2754:12-14.)34 
Budge's analysis, contrary to SARMC's assertion, accounted for other factors such as 
competition. For example, for referring physicians in the market by 1999, Budge only included 
in his calculations those physicians who had actually referred to MRICI. Likewise, he did not use 
in his calculations referring doctors who did not have privileges at SARMC. He assumed IM! 
34 This Court did not decide in Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, l 72 
P.3d 1119 (2007), as insinuated by SARMC's out of context quote, that a party cannot prove lost 
profit damages for breach of a non-compete clause through evidence of the breaching party's 
profits. Instead, this Court held that the trial court did not err in finding the proof of lost profits 
was deficient because Trilogy failed to introduce evidence of "any correspondence between what 
its profit would have been and [the breaching party's] actual profit, and thus failed to take the 
measure of its damages out of the realm of speculation. 144 Idaho at 847, 172 P.3d at l 122; see 
also Toddv. Sullivan Constr. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 122-23, 191 P.3d 196, 200-01 (2008). Here, 
MRIA met this standard because it applied its revenue and cost structure figures to the scans that 
were lost to IMI. (TR Vol. II at 2730:3-2731 :7; 2753: 17-2754: 16.) 
49 
would have obtained those scans even without SARMC's assistance. (Id. at 2742:24-2743:6.)35 
Budge then utilized MRIA's historical referral base (and MRIA's cost structure) to determine 
what MRIA's profits would have been had SARMC not competed against MRIA through !Ml. 
(Id. at 2744:3-9.) 
One of the things that I considered in computing the damage is to say there's 
nothing really, had these actions by the hospital not occurred, that would have stopped 
MRIA from just increasing into the foreseeable future .... 
What this red line shows is the actual scans that were done by [MRIA] plus the 
ones that I'm saying it would have performed but for the action of Saint Alphonsus in 
supporting this competitor of MRIA. 
And so this is what I call the but-for line. But for the actions of Saint Alphonsus, 
this is what the scan volumes would have looked like for MRICI. You can see that they go 
down. And we're basically saying in this alternative world that was really never allowed to 
happen, it's probably reasonable to assume that the scan volume would have gone down for 
MRICI because there would have been other entries in the market. This allows for the 
existence of !MI for those scans that were kind of outside of this Saint Alphonsus stable of 
referring physicians. 
(Id. at 2769:13-2770:19 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2756:21-2757:3.)36 In the above 
testimony, Budge is referring to Trial Ex. 4519 (Ex. D to attached Appendix) which graphically 
demonstrates the scans MRIA would have performed bu,t for SARMC's association with IM!. 
(Id.; TR Vol. II. at 2769:13-2770:19.) 
35 MRIA's approach gave the jury great flexibility in determining the amount because MRIA's 
experts divided the damages by date so that if the jury had found that damages began to accrue in 
2001 when SARMC officially joined IM! rather than 1999 when SARMC began supporting !MI, 
it was able to determine those damages. (Trial Exs. 4518, 4519; TR Vol. II at 2749:21-2752:6.) 
36 Wilhoite also used a very conservative discount factor and growth rate. He testified that had 
he not used such a conservative discount factor and growth, the damages would have been at 
least $20 million more than what the amount argued by MRIA. (Id. at 2864:25-2869:13.) 
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While Budge analyzed historical lost profits, MRIA's expert Charles Wilhoite analyzed future 
lost profits. He did so by modeling what the profits would have been but for SARMC's 
competition as compared to what the profits had been before SARMC's competition. (TR Vol. 
III at 2864: 19-2874:24; 2901: 13-16.) His analysis is consistent with Idaho law. Ryska v. 
Anderson, 70 Idaho 207,215,214 P.2d 874,878 (1950). Wilhoite, like Budge, accounted for 
competition from sources other than SARMC and based his damages solely on the migration of 
scans from MRI CI to IMI. (TR Vol. III at 2864:19-2874:24, 2897:17-2898:22, 2901 :13-16, 
2903:10-18; 2907:23-2908:3.) Wilhoite's own appraisal ofMRICI demonstrated a drop in fair 
market value from 2001 to 2006 of$32.5 million. This finding corroborates Budge's testimony 
that his lost profits figure is $12 million less than the total drop in fair market value. Therefore 
"other causes" impacting MRICI's loss in value were not included in Budge's analysis.37 (Id. at 
2874:3-24.) 
e. MRIA Was Not Required to Disprove that Referring Physicians 
Switched from Referring to MRIA to IMJ Because of the 
Radiologists' Reputation. 
SARMC suggests that MRIA had a burden to disprove that referring physicians switched from 
MRIA to IMI because of the reputation of the radiologists who were partners with SARMC in 
!MI. As set forth in Part IV. F. 1. above, that argument is a red herring because SARMC was a 
co-conspirator, joint venture and partner with the radiologists in IM!, and therefore is liable for 
referrals that IMI took from MRIA based on the reputation ofSARMC's co-conspirator and 
37 Further detail of the analysis ofMRIA's experts is set forth in TR Vol. II at 2745:23-2760:9 
and TR Vol. III at 2853:17-2874:20. 
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partner. Additionally, Idaho law does not require MRIA to disprove other causes. Griffith, 143 
Idaho at 740-41, 152 P.3d at 611-12; Thomas Helicopters, Inc., 102 Idaho at 570-01, 633 P.2d at 
1149-50 (Idaho I 981) ("[I]t is ... the rule that 'the possibility, or even probability of another 
cause for damages than that alleged does not defeat recovery where plaintiff presents sufficient 
facts to justffy a reasonable juror in concluding that the thing charged was the prime and moving 
cause"); Adams v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining Co., 12 Idaho 637, 643, 89 P. 624 (1906) 
(holding that "the jury would be justified in returning a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, although 
it be possible that the injury may have resulted from some other cause"). 
Furthennore, even if SARMC's argument that the referring physicians switched from MRIA to 
IM! because of the quality of the radiologists was relevant, it is not supported by the evidence. 
From 1999 to 2005, the same radiologists read images for both MRIA and !ML (Id at 2460:20-
2461 :7.) Trial Exhibit 4519 demonstrates scans were being lost to IM! long before 2005 when 
the radiologists began to read images exclusively for IM!. 
The argument also ignores the evidence that Budge stated that in computing the damages he 
only took into account the referrals that were lost because of SARMC's association with !ML 
(TR Vol. II at 2769:13-2770:21.) In fact, as set forth above, Budge and Wilhoite specifically 
took into account the fact that !Ml would have taken scans away from MRIA even ifSARMC 
had not supported !ML 38 (Id.; TR Vol. III at 2864: 19-2874:24, 2897: 17-2898:22, 2901: 13-16, 
2903:10-18; 2907:23-2908:3.) Furthennore, the sheer number of referring physicians made it 
38 Even SARMC's expert could not rule out SARMC's conduct as a cause for the switch in 
referrals. (TR Vol. III at 3234:17-3235:6.) 
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impracticable to perform the analysis SARMC erroneously alleges is required. (TR Vol. II at 
2766:8-2768:6.) Performing such an analysis is also impracticable because it is difficult to (I) 
get a representative sample, (2) get doctors to participate, and (3) get an unbiased sample. (Id.) 
SARMC's expert likewise did not do such an analysis. (TR Vol. III at 3235:15-3236:8.) MRIA 
analysis, without interviewing all 1900 referring physicians, proved the amount of damage with 
reasonable certainty and SARMC as the wrongdoer cannot complain about any uncertainty. 
Griffith, 143 Idaho at 740-41, 152 P.3d at 611-12.39 
3. MRIA is also Entitled to Damages Because SARMC Usurped a 
Partnership Opportunity. 
SARMC owed a fiduciary duty to MRIA not to usurp a partnership opportunity. LC. § 53-3-
404(b)(l). Under this rule, the misappropriation of a partnership opportunity is considered a 
usurpation of partnership property and a breach of a fiduciary duty and the partnership is entitled 
to any profits realized from such usurpation. See id. ( official comment). Here, as set forth in Part 
I.E. F. supra., SARMC usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with the radiologists, GSR, in an 
imaging center and took that opportunity for itself by partnering with the radiologists in IMI. As 
discussed above, MRIA took a more conservative approach than what would be allowed under a 
theory of usurpation. 
4. MRIA ls Entitled to Lost Profits Through 2023 
SARMC argues the trial court erred in allowing MRIA to seek lost scan damages for the years 
2015 to 2023 and bases its argument on the erroneous assertion that MRIA "did not make any 
39 Conspicuously, SARMC offered no alternative methodology. 
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evidentiary showing to support its claim" that the partnership term for MRICI was extended from 
2015 to 2023. Evidently SARMC's new appellate counsel has not read the record. Numerous 
witnesses, including SARMC witnesses, testified the partnership terms were extended to 2023. 
For example, SARMC's CEO and CFO both testified they understood the term ofMRICI had 
been extended to 2023 and that SARMC ratified the extension. (Id. at 1676:3-6, 1678:17-21, 
3521 :7-21, 3534: 11-18, 3535:10-14.) SARMC's COO even testified that the non-compete in the 
MRIA partnership agreement was extended until 2023. (Id. at 3592:5-21.) She further testified 
the lease for MRICI on SARMC's campus was extended until 2023 consistent with the extension 
of the partnership term to 2023. (Id. at 3533:6-3534:16.) Thus, SARMC's two top officers 
testified the partnership term was extended to 2023. 
The other members ofMRIA also testified the partnership terms were extended to 2023. Dr. 
Jim Prochaska testified the extension of the partnership term to 2023 was approved by a 
"unanimous vote" by the MRIA Board of Partners, which included SARMC. (TR. Vol. II at 
1148:24-1149:1.) Dr. Prochaska also testified it was his understanding that ifSARMC withdrew 
from MRIA, it could not compete until 2023. (Id. at 1390:11-15, 1397:22-1398:13.) Joe 
Messmer, CEO of Mercy Medical Center (a member of the board of partners through its 
subsidiary MedNow, Inc.), also testified it was his understanding that the partnership term was 
extended to 2023, including the non-compete prohibition. (Id. at 2221 :21-2222:2) Dr. Giles, 
another member ofMRIA, testified that term for MRICI was extended to 2023. (Id. at 3054:6-9.) 
The sole piece of evidence SARMC holds out to support its position, a perfunctory filing with 
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the State ofldaho, is not sufficient to overturn the jury's verdict. 40 Thus, contrary to SARMC's 
assertion, the testimony from all partners, including SARMC, was the same: the partnership term 
had been extended to 2023. SARMC cited to no contrary testimony. 41 
G. MRIA'S Measure of Damages for Wrongful Dissociation was Properly 
Submitted to the Jury, 
As set forth in Part IV. A., at trial MRIA submitted two alternate damage theories, consisting 
of lost profits of $36.3 million and wrongful dissociation damages $27.3 million. SARMC 
attacks the wrongful dissociation damages theory by asserting the amount bears no relation to 
any harm suffered by MRIA. The Court need not address this argument, because as set forth 
above, MRIA adequately proved its entitlement to lost profits and the remitted amount of the 
verdict can be sustained on that basis alone. However, even if the argument was not moot, it fails 
because Idaho law recognizes that a "[p ]laintiff may sue on the contract and seek damages based 
on her expectation interest under the contract." White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 
102, 730 P.2d 1014, 1022 (1986). Those damages "may be measured by 'the loss in the value to 
40 Additionally, the documentary evidence demonstrated the partnership terms were extended to 
2023: 
• Trial Exhibit 4054 is minutes from an MRIA board meeting reflecting that "Motion was 
moved and approved to extend the term of MRI Center limited partnerships to December 
31st, 2023.', (Trial Ex. 4054 at 2.) 
• Trial Exhibit 4109 is meeting minutes of SARMC entity SADC showing SARMC ratified the 
extension of"'the term of the MRI Partnership Agreement to 12/31/23." (Trial Ex. 4109.) 
• Trial Exhibit 4105 is meeting minutes of MRJCJ reflecting that Cindy Schamp of SARMC 
informed the board that the lease for MRICI was extended to 2023. (Trial Ex. 4105 at 2.) 
41 Moreover, SARMC waived any right to claim the partnership terms were not extended by 
voluntarily relinquishing that claim through ratifying the vote to extend the term. Frontier Fed 
Sav. & Loan v. Douglass, 123 Idaho 808,812,853 P.2d 553,557 (1993). Thus, SARMC is 
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[the injured party] of[the breaching party's] performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus 
any loss, including incidental or consequential, caused by the breach."' Id ( quoting Restatement 
(Second) Contracts,§ 347 (1981). 
At trial, it was shown that since 1999, SARMC had been advised by its consultants that if it 
wished to exit MRIA, partner with the radiologists and pursue imaging opportunities in its 
service area, the lawful approach would be to buy its way out of the partnership (and the non-
compete provision which was part and parcel of the partnership) and purchase 100% ofMRICI 
from MRIA. (TR Vol. III at 3593:22-3599:18; Trial Exs. 4118 & 4247.) This purchase of 
MRICI would leave MRIA with only its mobile business, which served the other hospital 
partners and other markets. By owning MRICI, SARMC could share ownership of its campus 
operation with GSR and compete for MRI scanning business in the Treasure Valley. 
SARMC's consultants also told SARMC that ifit wished to achieve its objectives the cost 
would be in excess of$20 million. (Trial Ex. 4247 at 25, 28-36.) Although this was the fair 
market value for the transaction, SARMC refused to pay such an amount to its partners. Instead, 
SARMC chose the "wrongful" method of achieving its goals: it wrongfully dissociated and 
competed with MRIA's campus operation (MRICI), through its other partnership (!Ml). By this 
means, SARMC obtained the business of MRICI without paying for it. 
MRIA's experts Budge and Wilhoite both testified that the value ofMRIA's contract rights 
that were violated by SARMC's wrongful dissociation could be measured by what SARMC 
stopped. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,282,486 P.2d 992, 995 (1971) (applying the 
doctrine of quasi-estoppel to similar facts). 
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would have to pay on the date of dissociation to rightfully attain its business objectives of 
obtaining the business ofMRICI. (TR Vol. II at 2676:11- 2704:8; 2724:16-2725:15; Vol. III at 
2883:5- 2891:15.) The fair market value ofMRICI on that date was $27.3 million. (TR Vol. III 
at 2891 :6-15.) This evidence was unrebutted. In fact, the only cross examination before the jury 
on the matter related to SARMC's effort to obtain an acknowledgement from Wilhoite that the 
SARMC could have purchased MRICI for less than $27.3 million. (TR Vol. III at 2912:20-
2916:7.) 
In this case, it was difficult to isolate the impact of SARMC's wrongful dissociation. This was 
because SARMC had engaged in various wrongful activities before the date of dissociation. As 
a result, scan migration to IMI was well underway by the time SARMC dissociated. Thus, 
MRIA's experts believed that measuring wrongful dissociation damages by the cost of what 
SARMC would have to pay on the date of withdrawal to rightfully dissociate provided a fair 
measure of the benefit ofMRIA's bargain which had been circumvented by SARMC's unlawful 
withdrawal. 
H. Admitting the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum Was Not Error. 
SARMC argues the trial court erred by admitting into evidence Trial Exhibit 4239 (the "SH 
memorandum", also referred to below as the "Finnerty Memorandum"), an internal 
memorandum prepared by SH. SARMC's objection is limited to the following passages in the 13 
page memorandum:(!) "SARMC has been advised by counsel that this option [withdrawing and 
competing with MRIA] will likely engender litigation with MRIA" and (2) "Givens Pursley 
believes there likely would be litigation as to whether the termination was wrongful and that 
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there may be a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility to the LPs." (Opening 
Brief at 36-38; Trial Ex. 4239 at 2, 11.) SARMC's argument fails for the following reasons. 
1. SARMC Failed to Preserve Its Objection. 
"When presented with a motion in limine, a trial court has the authority to deny the motion and 
wait until trial to determine if the evidence should or should not be excluded." Kirk v. Ford 
Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 702, 116 P.3d 27, 32 (2005). When the trial court elects to wait and 
hear foundation "the moving party is required to continue to object as the evidence is presented." 
Id. Here, SARMC failed to preserve its objection because the trial court withheld its ruling, and 
SARMC then failed to object when the evidence was presented. 
Although SARMC filed two motions in limine on this exhibit (R. Vol. VIII at 1453, R. Vol. XI 
at 2152), the privilege issue raised in the motions was never ruled upon by the trial court. (R. 
2111-2141; TR. Vol. I at 985:14-24.) The trial court's ruling merely stated generically as to the 
"Shattuck Hammond memorandum" that it would need to see more "further foundation before 
that's presented to the jury." (Id. at 1086:2-6.) 
The exhibit was first offered into evidence during the examination of Dr. James Prochaska. 
(TR Vol. II at 1847:11-1853:25). At the time it was offered, SARMC did not raise any objection 
on privilege grounds. (Id). Therefore, SARMC failed to preserve its objection for appeal. 
2. SARMC Waived Any Claim of Privilege. 
Under I.R.E. 510, a privilege is waived if the holder of the privilege "voluntarily discloses or 
consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication." See Skelton v. 
Spencer, 98 Idaho417,420, 565 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1977), Statev. Nab, 113 Idaho 168,174,742 
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P.2d 423,429 (Ct. App. 1987). Waiver also occurs from failure to object to privileged testimony 
or documents at a pre-trial deposition. Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379,384 (4th Cir. 1998); In 
re Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 153 B.R. 457,465 n.5 (W.D. Mich. 1993). Furthermore, such 
conduct waives the privilege as to the entire subject matter of the disclosure. Hawkins, I 48 F.3d 
at 384 n.4. 
The exhibit was produced at a discovery deposition of a SH employee. (R. Vol. IV at 785-86). 
Before the deposition, SARMC's counsel told MRIA it had performed a privilege review and 
was producing non-privileged documents at the deposition. (Id). During the deposition, counsel 
for SH stated on the record that, with respect to any privilege being claimed, it was up to Pat 
Miller, SARMC's counsel, "to waive it and do whatever they want to do with it. So I'm 
expecting that if Pat [Miller] has an issue relating to the privilege, he should invoke it here .... " 
(Id. citing Confidential Ex. 2 to the Record, at ,r 3 and Ex. B thereto at 36:14-37:2). Miller, 
however, never objected to production of the SH documents at the deposition the SH 
memorandum was identified as part of SH's work for SARMC, not its work for Givens Pursley. 
(Id. at 787-88). Three months later, MRIA deposed Dr. Ian Davey, marked the memorandum as 
an exhibit and asked numerous detailed questions about various statements in the document 
without objection by SARMC's counsel. (Id. at 78; see also R. Ex. 131 at 9-10). 
On May 27, 2007, the deposition of Grant Chamberlain of SH was taken for purposes of 
perpetuating his testimony for trial. (R. Ex. 193, Ex. A thereto at 2; TR Vol. II at 2544: 13-17). At 
that time, SARMC stipulated to the admission of the memorandum and did not make any 
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objections to testimony associated with the allegedly privileged portions of the memorandum. 42 
(TR Vol. II at 2546:19-25). Chamberlain's deposition testimony concerning the memorandum, 
including the allegedly privileged portions, was then read into the record at trial without 
objection from SARMC. (TR Vol. II at 2543:23-2544:25; 2561:25-2562:13). fndeed, 
Chamberlain repeatedly referred to information he learned from Pat Miller of Givens Pursley 
with no objection at all from SARMC. 
Q: Did you have an understanding. during the course of your engagement on this 
particular project for Saint Alphonsus, that it was understood by Saint Alphonsus that if it 
withdrew and competed with the existing MRI facilities on its own campus, that they 
would likely -- that that would likely engender litigation? 
A. Was it a potential? Yes. 
Q. And what were the likely sources of that information? 
A. Pat Miller and the client. 
(TR Vol. II at 2567:20-2568:3 (emphasis added); see also Ex. D to the Appendix attached 
hereto.) All of this testimony came in without objection. 
3. Even if the Objection Was Not Waived, Admitting the Memorandum 
Was Not Error. 
Trial courts have broad discretion over the admission of evidence at trial. Kirk v. Ford Motor 
Co. 141 Idaho 697, 700-701, 116 P.3d 27, 30-31 (2005). Error may only be predicated upon a 
ruling that is a "manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right of the party is 
affected." Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd., 127 Idaho 565,574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 
42 This deposition took place before SARMC filed its motions in limine concerning the Shattuck 
Hammond memorandum. Those motions were filed on June 5, 2007 (R. 1453) and August 3, 
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(1995) (emphasis added). Here, the trial court's decision to admit the SH memorandum was 
appropriate because the memorandum is not covered by the I.R.E. 502 privilege as the privilege 
applies only if the communication is confidential within the meaning of the rule and is made 
between persons described in the rule for the purposes of rendering legal advice. Farr v. 
Mischler, 129 ldaho 201,207,923 P.2d 446,452 (1996). The burden of showing information is 
privileged is on the party asserting the privilege. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 14 I Idaho 697, 704, 
116 P.3d 27, 34 (2005). 
SARMC has not shown the SH memorandum memorialized any communication between 
persons described in the rule. The comments included in the memorandum were not 
communications "between the client's lawyer and the lawyer's representative." I.R.E. 502(b)(2). 
Although SH was hired on one occasion by Givens Pursley, the evidence is clear the 
memorandum was prepared as a result of the separate retention of SH by SARMC. (R. at 785-89, 
citing Confidential Ex. 2 to the Record, at ,r 3 and Ex. B thereto; R. Ex. 131 at 7.) The 
memorandum states that SH "has been engaged by SARMC to prepare a Strategic Options 
Assessment" with the purpose to "advise SARMC on a potential transaction" (Trial Ex. 4239 at 
2) (emphasis added). Thus, for purposes of the memorandum, SH was not a lawyer's 
representative. I.R.E. 502(a)(4). The mere fact that SH indicated it had "reviewed (SARMC's 
options) with Givens Pursley ... [ and had) included their thoughts on the potential litigation 
involved with each alternative," (Trial Ex. 4239 at 11 ), does not establish that those 
2007 (R. 2 I 52). By that time, it was too late, the privilege had already been waived at the May 
27, 2007 deposition. 
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communications were made while SH was acting as a "representative of the lawyer." Indeed, the 
trial court found, the memorandum was prepared in connection with SARMC's retention of SH. 
(R. at 785-89, citing Confidential Ex. 2 to the Record, at 13 and Ex. B thereto; R. at 850.)43 
Finally, SARMC presented no evidence that the memorandum was intended to be kept 
confidential. (R. Ex. 131 at 7-8.) Therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting the 
memorandum into evidence. 
4. If There Was an Error, the Error was Harmless 
Although the admission of the SH memorandum was not an error, even if it was an error, the 
error was harmless because there was other evidence that SARMC "knew as early as 2001 that it 
could not withdraw" (R. Vol. XIII at 2440). Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 116 Idaho 
794, 799, 780 P.2d 116, 121 (1989). For example, SARMC's CEO testified she understood 
before SARMC dissociated from MRIA that SARMC could be liable for damages for wrongful 
dissociation. (TR. Vol. II at 1950:10-15). She disavowed learning this information from the 
memorandum. (Id. at 1950: 16-1951 :4). Likewise, SARMC's COO testified that in 2001 she 
understood withdrawal would likely engender litigation and could be a breach of fiduciary 
43 In a footnote, SARMC suggests in the alternative that this was a privileged communication 
between the client's representative and the client's lawyer. 1.R.E. 502(b)(I). A "'representative of 
the client' is one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or an employee of the 
client who is authorized to communicate information obtained in the course of employment to 
the attorney of the client." I.R.E. 502(a)(2). SARMC did not present any evidence that Shattuck 
Hammond had such authority. Nor is there any evidence that the communication was made to 
Shattuck Hammond for the purpose of conveying legal advice to SARMC. Moreover, this 
argument was not raised below and therefore cannot be raised on appeal. Mihalka v. Shepherd, 
145 Idaho 547,552, 181 P.3d 473,478 (2008). 
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duties. (TR Vol. III at 3594:9-13; 3595:23-3596:6).44 She further testified she learned this 
information from Grant Chamberlain, not Givens Pursley. (Id). Therefore, because there "was 
other competent evidence to the same effect", any error was harmless. 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Admitting Exhibit 4332. 
SARMC argues that the trial court erred by admitting Exhibit 4332, a letter SARMC claims is 
barred by l.R.E. 408. SARMC waived its objection to the admission of this exhibit by failing to 
object at the necessary times. Even if SARMC had not waived its objection, however, the trial 
court did not err in admitting the exhibit because the exhibit is not barred by l.R.E. 408. 
Moreover, SARMC suffered no prejudice and any error was harmless. 
1. Exhibit 4332 is Not Barred by Rule 408 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 provides that offers to compromise are not admissible "to prove 
liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the claim or any other claim." Nonetheless, the Rule 
"does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or 
prejudice ofa witness, negativing a contention of undue delay .... " Id (emphasis added). This 
Court has also held that settlement offers may be admitted for impeachment. Davidson v. Beco 
Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 109-111, 753 P.2d 1253, 1255-57(1987). 
SARMC complains that the use of Exhibit 4332 during the examination of Sandra Bruce and 
during closing arguments violated I.R.E. 408. There was no violation, however, because the 
document was used at those times to impeach SARMC's contention that it tried to work out a 
deal, but MRIA would not allow it to do so. In opening statement, SARMC's counsel asserted 
44 There was no objection by SARMC to this testimony from its CEO and COO. 
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"the proof is going to show that she [, Sandra Bruce,] tried many, many efforts during this period 
of time" to get a deal done. (TR Vol. I at 1076:25-1077: 1 ). "She tried everything that she could 
think of. She hired consultants to come in. The consultants were paid for out of Saint 
Alphonsus's pocket. And she tried and tried and tried. She couldn't get it done." (Id at 1077:2-5; 
see also id at 1077:5-18). The inference from counsel's statements was that SARMC tried to 
reach a compromise with MRIA, but was unable to do so because of MRIA 's recalcitrance. 
This same argument was continued when Ms. Bruce testified she tried for five years to buy out 
MRIA but ultimately could not reach a deal because ofMRIA's conduct. (TR Vol. II at 1945:4-
1948:13; 1954:4-13). The inference of this testimony, as with the opening statement, was that 
MRIA impeded SARMC's alleged efforts to negotiate a deal. MRIA used Exhibit 4332 in its 
examination of Bruce and in closing for the purpose of rebutting Bruce's contention of undue 
delay and otherwise impeaching her testimony by showing MRIA had offered SARMC the deal 
Bruce claimed SARMC was seeking. (TR Vol. Hat 1954:15-1955:2). Thus, the exhibit shows 
MRIA did make an attempt to settle in an amount similar to the valuation performed by 
SARMC's consultants. 
Indeed, MRIA' s use of the exhibit was similar to the use of a settlement offer in Davidson v. 
Beco Corp., which this Court found to be proper. In that case, this Court noted the "settlement 
letter" indicated an offer was made that was rejected. Davidson, l 14 Idaho at 111, 753 P.2d at 
1257. "Of course, this is contrary to Beck's testimony at trial that Davidson had accepted the 
tractor in full satisfaction of the debt." Id. Accordingly, this Court held "[t]he probative value of 
the statement in the settlement letter is great in that it tends to show Beck's testimony is 
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unreliable. Probative evidence is always prejudicial to someone" and on that basis this Court 
held the letter was admissible to impeach the contrary testimony. Id. For those same reasons, 
Exhibit 4332 was admissible to impeach SARMC's assertions in opening statements and the 
testimony of Sandra Bruce.45 
2. SARMC Waived Its Objection 
Although SARMC objected to the exhibit when it was first offered, it did not object to the later 
use of the exhibit with subsequent witnesses and during closing arguments. The exhibit was first 
offered during the testimony of Dr. Prochaska. (TR. Vol. II at 1239:9-1246:25). The transcript 
portions cited by SARMC in support of its argument that Exhibit 4332 was used for prejudicial 
purposes, however, do not include any testimony from Dr. Prochaska. Instead, they include the 
subsequent testimony of Sandra Bruce and MRIA' s closing argument. A review of those portions 
of the transcript reveals that SARMC did not object when the exhibit was used at those times. 
While SARMC may argue it had a continuing objection, the trial court was not able to 
articulate a continuing objection because Judge McLaughlin was cut off by SARMC's counsel, 
Jack Gjording. (TR Vol. II at 1245:19-21). As a result, the continuing objection was not 
established, and when the trial court finally admitted the exhibit with a limiting instruction, it 
made no mention of the continuing objection. (Id. at 1245:19-1246:25). This is likely because 
there was no need for a continuing objection as the matter was resolved by the limiting 
45 Through selective passages, SARMC attempts to make it appear that MRIA in closing 
argument used the exhibit as "the 'telltale' sign of [SARMC's] bad faith." If, however, the 
statements are taken in their complete context, it shows that the exhibit was used for purposes of 
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instruction. However, even if SARMC had perfected a continuing objection during the testimony 
of Dr. Prochaska, that objection did not preserve SARMC's objection to (I) MRIA's use of the 
exhibit outside of the limiting instruction (i.e., to show bad faith) and (2) MRIA's use of the 
exhibit with a different witness, Sandra Bruce, and during closing argument. 
The trial court's limiting instruction authorized MRIA to use the exhibit to show what MRIA 
believed to be the fair market value ofMRIA. (TR. Vol. II at 1246:17-24). SARMC now 
complains that after the limiting instruction, MRIA used the exhibit to show bad faith by 
SARMC. Although MRIA disputes it used the exhibit to show bad faith, had MRIA done so, 
SARMC failed to preserve its objection to a use of the exhibit outside of the limiting instruction. 
See Crossley by Crossley v. General Motors Corp., 33 F.3d 818,822 (7th Cir. 1994); Rinker v. 
Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655,664 (Mo. App. 1978). 
Additionally, this Court has recognized that a continuing objection does not preserve error 
when another witness testifies to the same matter without objection. Mac Tools, Inc. v. Griffin, 
126 Idaho 193,200,879 P.2d 1126, 1133 (1994); See also Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 187 S.W.3d 
570,587 (Tex.Civ.App.2006). Therefore, because SARMC did not object to the use of the 
exhibit during Sandra Bruce's testimony and did not object to the use of the exhibit during 
closing argument, it failed to preserve the objection for appeal. 46 
3. SARMC Was Not Prejudiced By the Admission of Exhibit 4332. 
negativing Ms. Bruce's testimony and SARMC's assertions in opening statement that SARMC 
"tried and tried" to get a deal done. (See e.g., TR Vol. III at 4321: 19-4322: 15). 
46 SARMC also waived its objection, by SARMC's use of the exhibit during its direct 
examination of Dr. David Giles. (TR Vol. III at 3147:12-3148:5.) 
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Trial courts have "broad discretion as to the admission of evidence and the exercise of that 
discretion will not be overturned absent a clear showing of abuse." Cheney v. Palos Verdes 
Investment Corp., 104 Idaho 897,900,665 P.2d 661,664 (1983) (emphasis added). SARMC 
must show the exhibit was erroneously admitted and that the admission of the exhibit "had a 
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 
Idaho 594, 606, 726 P.2d 706, 718 (1986). SARMC cannot show the admission of this exhibit 
had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict, because as the trial court found, there 
was overwhelming evidence ofSARMC's willful and malicious conduct. (TR Vol. III at 4471:9-
17). 
Also the exhibit did not affect the jury's findings on damages. (R. Vol. XIII at 2442.) The trial 
court recognized MRIA had two damage theories described by the trial court as the "purchase 
price theory" and "the lost scan theory." (Id.) The primary evidence used to show the purchase 
price theory (referred to by MRIA as the lost benefit of the bargain) was a valuation performed 
by SH. (see Exhibits 4246 and 4247); MRIA did not use Exhibit 4332. From that valuation, 
MRIA argued $27.3 million was the amount SARMC would have to pay to rightfully buy its 
way out of the partnership. (TR Vol. III at 4382:20-4385:17.) 
Furthermore, as the trial court recognized "even if this evidence [Trial Ex. 4332] was not 
introduced, or even if the purchase price theory had not been argued at all, there is a good 
argument that the end result would be no different for Saint Alphonsus." (R. Vol. XIII at 2442.) 
According to the trial court, "[t]he lost scan analysis of damages was the higher of the two 
damage theories, and it is apparent from the jury verdict that the jury found not just the purchase 
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price theory persuasive, but also the lost scan analysis." (Id. (emphasis added)). The trial court, 
then concluded SARMC had "not adequately shown that the evidence's absence would have 
affected the jury's findings." (/d.) On appeal, SARMC still has not demonstrated the admission 
of the evidence "had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." Therefore, it is not 
entitled to a new trial. 
V. CROSS-APPEAL 
If SARMC's request for a new trial is denied on appeal, the Court need not address MRIA's 
cross-appeal. MRIA only seeks to appeal the following rulings if the Court determines that a new 
trial is warranted. 
A. The Trial Court Erred by Denying MRIA's Request to Seek Punitive Damages. 
The trial court denied both MRIA' s motion to amend its complaint to add a claim for punitive 
damages and its renewed motion after the close of the evidence. It found SARMC's conduct did 
not rise to the level of"'willfulness' and 'wantonness' the statute calls for nor can I find that 
that's been demonstrated here by clear and convincing evidence." This finding was later 
contradicted by the trial court when it stated during the hearing on SARMC's motion for new 
trial that the evidence was "overwhelming" and "clear and convincing" that "the executive 
management team at Saint Alphonsus really blatantly ignored the partnership rights of a partner . 
. . . It was demonstrated to th[ e] jury that Saint Alphonsus chose to compete directly/indirectly 
with a partner." (TR Vol. III at 4471 :9-17.) This finding that there was clear and convincing 
evidence that (I) SARMC "blatantly ignored" the rights of MRIA and (2) improperly competed 
with MRIA while still a partner in MRIA demonstrates the trial court's failure to instruct on 
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punitive damages "was so contrary to the facts of the case as to amount to an abuse of discretion 
under the deferential standard." General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 
849,825,979 P.2d 1207, 1210 (1999). 
l. The Punitive Damages Standard 
A party is entitled to punitive damages when it proves by clear and convincing evidence that 
the other party's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous. I. C. § 6-1604(1). 
Interpreting this standard, this Court held in Linscott v. Ranier Nat 'I Life Ins. Co., I 00 Idaho 854, 
858, 606 P.2d 958, 962 (I 980) that the activity necessary to reach an award of punitive damages 
"requires an intersection of two factors: a bad act and a bad state of mind." Id In the business 
context, punitive damages may be awarded where the conduct "show[ s] a lack of professional 
regard for the consequences of the breach of the contractual agreement." Cuddy Mountain 
Concrete Inc. v. Citadel Constr., Inc., 121 Idaho 220,229,824 P.2d 151, 160 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1992). Here, the issue of punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury because 
SARMC in conscious disregard of the consequences (the bad state of mind) competed with its 
partner MRIA and "violated another's [MRIA's] legal right[s]" (the bad act). 
2. The Evidence is Clear and Convincing that SARMC Acted with a 
Conscious Disregard for the Rights of MRIA. 
As set forth above, even though the trial court denied MRIA' s motions for leave to seek 
punitive damages, the trial court found there was clear and convincing evidence that SARMC 
"blatantly ignored the partnership rights of a partner." This finding satisfies the standard that this 
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Court has set for awarding punitive damages in a business context. Id. This finding also 
highlights that it was error to deny MRIA leave to seek punitive damages. 
The totality of the evidence as set forth in Part I supra., demonstrates in a clear and convincing 
fashion that SARMC, while still a partner in MRIA, competed with its partners in MRIA by 
conspiring with, supporting, and later becoming a partner in IMI. SARMC did so in conscious 
violation of its fiduciary duties and the partnership agreement as it was warned by its consultants 
and its attorneys that it would be a breach of its fiduciary duties to withdraw and compete. In 
fact, Sandra Bruce admitted it would be a violation of MRIA partnership agreement to operate a 
competing imaging business that took revenue away from MRIA. (TR Vol. II at 1690:20-
169 l: 5.) Despite this knowledge, SARMC deliberately chose to support and join a competitor 
while still a partner in MRIA. SARMC's outrageous attitude toward its partners in MRIA is 
summed up in its CEO testimony that: "I was a partner with a competitor. I was supporting 
myself." (Id. at 1871 :8-9.) Thus, it was error to deny MRIA leave to seek punitive damages. 
B. SARMC Erred by Dismissing MRIA's Antitrust Claims 
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of SARMC dismissing 
MRIA's antitrust counterclaims. (See R. Vol. V, p. 905-946; R. Vol. XI p. 2077-81). The trial 
court wrongly held that MRIA lacked standing because it had not suffered an "antitrust injury." 
The evidence presented by MRIA on this issue is sufficient to prove that the antitrust claims 
should have survived summary judgment. 
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1. MRIA Sufficiently Asserted an Antitrust Injury 
Antitrust laws generally provide it is unlawful for a person to monopolize, attempt to 
monopolize, or conspire to monopolize. See I.C. § 48-105; 15 U.S.C. § 2. A private plaintiff has 
standing to bring an antitrust claim if it (I) asserts an antitrust injury and (2) is a proper party to 
assert the antitrust laws' application to a particular circumstance. See Balak/aw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 
793, 797 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
A plaintiff establishes an antitrust injury if it shows it has sustained an injury of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Daniel v. Amer. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F .3d 408, 
438 (2nd Cir. 2005). The purpose of antitrust laws is to protect the public by keeping the channels 
of competition free so prices and services are determined by the workings of a free market. 
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Com'n., 193 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
Because antitrust laws were designed to protect competition, antitrust plaintiffs have standing if 
they show harm to competition as a whole. See New York Medscan LLC v. New York Univ. Sch. 
of Med., 430 F. Supp. 2d 140, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A plaintiff shows harm to competition by 
alleging adverse effects on the price, quality, or output of the relevant good or service. See New 
York Medscan, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 146. 
In New York Medscan, PlaintiffMedscan and Defendant NYU entered a contract whereby 
Medscan provided facilities, and diagnostic imaging services for NYU radiologists. Medscan 
was an approved provider for an insurance entity called CCN. Because of CCN' s own exclusive 
contracts with large regional insurance agencies, it was essential for an imaging company such as 
Medscan to be CCN approved. As the agreement between Medscan and NYU approached is 
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expiration, an NYU representative advised Medscan that ifMedscan did not renew the 
agreement under the terms demanded by NYU, NYU would use its influence and Medscan 
would lose its CCN-approved status. No agreement was reached and Medscan's CCN approval 
was terminated. Medscan brought an action alleging an antitrust violation. The Court held that 
Medscan sufficiently alleged an antitrust injury, noting Medscan had alleged that NYU's conduct 
caused reduced competition in the provision of medical imaging services, reduced competition in 
the price of these services, and reduced quality of imaging services. The court also noted the 
damages to Medscan's reputation, services, and profit had an anti-competitive impact on the 
price and output on the market for imaging services in the New York City area as a whole. Id. at 
147-48. 
As MRIA alleged, SARMC's tactics with its co-conspirators in IMI, which discouraged 
MRIA's growth and damaged its business and reputation, (R. Vol. V., p. 905-46, at 1140, 42, 49, 
50-54, 67-71, 110-118, 123-127, 128-132),47 had the effect of reducing patient care; (id at ,,r 40, 
47 Specifically, MRJA asserted that these tactics included 
• Creating uncertainty among referring physicians and MRICI employees by disparaging 
MRJCI's services through confusing and misleading reports to the referring physician 
community. (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 7, Exhibit PP thereto) 
• Providing disparate levels of services as between IMI and MRICI when GSR operated as 
the radiologists for both imaging entities. R., Conf. Ex. 1 at 7, Exhibit 00 thereto) 
• Threatening to terminate MRICI's access to SARMC's IT system, potentially jeopardizing 
the ability of MRI CI to store and transmit its electronic images to the referring physician 
community. (R. Conf. Ex. 1 at 3, Exhibit Hand at 7, Exhibit 00 thereto) 
• Receiving higher prices for comparable goods and services, relative to other sellers in the 
identified product and geographic market. (R. Ex. 143 at 2, Exhibits A & B thereto) 
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68, 127); increasing price, (id at 11 66, 127); and decreasing the output of medical imaging (id 
at 172). Additionally, MRIA submitted an affidavit and a report from its economic expert, 
Edward Whitelaw, stating that "IMI received higher payments for providing services of 
comparable quality to similar patients to those received by other sellers." (Exhibit to the R. No. 
144 at, 2). MRIA also submitted evidence that at the same time IMI was charging higher prices, 
IMI was also increasing its market share. (Id. at if12-3). Based on this evidence, Whitelaw opined 
that IMI "acquired market power and harmed competition in the market" (Id. at 12. (See also 
Exhibit to the R. No. 110 at Exhibit A, p. 2-14). Further, in his deposition, Whitelaw was asked 
"[a]nd you find that the IMI-SADC imaging partnership has harmed competition in the relevant 
market by receiving higher-than-market rates for taking MRI scans relative to what those scans 
would have been in the absence of such anticompetitive behavior?" Whitelaw answered "Yes." 
(Exhibit to the R. 104 at Ex. D p. 50:14-23). According to Whitelaw, the anticompetitive 
conduct, taken together, likely contributed to the growth ofIMI's market share, thus affecting its 
growing monopoly power. See, R. Ex. 143 at 2, Exhibit A thereto at 12). 
This testimony from Whitelaw is sufficient to defeat summary judgment because, contrary to 
the trial court's holding otherwise, MRIA has shown harm to competition, including adverse 
effects on price, quality, and output of MRI scans in the Boise/Meridian market. As one court 
held, antitrust standing is conferred on a plaintiff that can show higher prices coupled with a 
• Directing hospital inpatient and outpatients to an imaging center, IMI) in which the 
SARMC had an interest in violation of STARK laws. (R. Conf. Ex. I at 6, Exhibit LL and 
Ex. 143 at 2, Exhibit B thereto) 
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large market share. American Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians and Surgeons v. 
American Bd of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 185 F.3d 606,623 (6th Cir. 1999). That is exactly what 
MRIA demonstrated through Whitelaw's testimony. Because MRIA showed an antitrust injury, 
the issue of whether SARMC's and IMI's conduct was the result of anticompetitive motivation, 
and thus an antitrust violation, should have been presented to the jury.48 
2. MRIA Created an Issne of Fact Under this Court's Decision in Twin 
Falls Farm & City Distributing, Inc. v. D & B Supply Co. 
The trial court's summary judgment ruling was also in error because it ignores this Court's 
decision in Twin Falls Farm & City Distributing, Inc. v. D & B Supply Co, 96 Idaho 351, 528 
P.2d 1286 (1974). Here, the conduct and damages are virtually identical to the conduct and 
damages which this Court found to be sufficient to sustain an antitrust claim in Twin Falls. 
This Court in Twin Falls did not require the plaintiff to show evidence of a market-wide injury, 
as required by the trial court in the instant case. Instead, this Court found it sufficient that the 
plaintiff was injured by the conspiracy between D & B and Fries to drive Twin Falls out of 
business. Id at 359, 528 P.2d at 1294. Here, there was evidence presented to the trial court 
creating an issue of fact that SARMC and !MI conspired to drive MRIA out of business. Such 
evidence is sufficient to sustain an antitrust claim under this Court decision in Twin Falls. 
48 To the extent that the trial court reasoned that Whitelaw's report did not sufficiently show a 
"market wide injury," the court itself hampered MRIA's ability to prove market-wide injury 
when it ruled that MRI providers in the relevant market would not be required to produce any 
records of MRI scans. (R. Vol. III, p. 557-60.) That decision prevented MRIA from presenting 
critical evidence concerning harm in the market. (See Exhibit to the R. No. 110, Exhibit A, p. 2-
3). Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357,363, 956 P.2d 674,680 (1998) (recognizing that 
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Therefore, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment against MRIA on MRIA's 
antitrust claims. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, MRIA respectfully requests the Court to deny 
SARMC's requested relief and grant MRIA its attorneys' fees and costs. In the event a new trial 
is ordered, MRIA also respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial court and grant MRIA 
leave to seek punitive damages and allow MRIA to present its anti-trust claims to the jury. 
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75 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of November, 2008, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were served upon the following counsel for Appellant in the 
manner set forth below: 
Donald B. Ayer (VIA FEDEX) 
Christian G. Vergonis 
JONES DAY 
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113 
Jack S. Gjording (VIA HAND DELIVERY) 
GJORDING & FOUSER, LLC 
509 W. Hays Street 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, ID 83701 
Patrick J. Miller (VIA HAND DELIVERY) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 601 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 






INDEX TO APPENDIX 
Cast of Characters 
Expert Charts (Trial Exhibits 4519, 4518, 4517, 4516, 4515, 4527, 45426, 4521, 4520) 




CAST OF CHARACTERS 
PARTY/WITNESS AFFILIATION 
Adams,Mark CEO, West Vallev Medical Center 
Anton, Chris Former CEO, SARMC 
Bruce, Sandra CEO and President, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center 
Bud2e. Bruce Expert Regarding Damages, MRIA 
Chamberlain, Grant Consultant to SARMC, Shattuck Hammond 
Cliff, Jeff MRIA "CFO"; IMI Executive Director 2002-Present; 
Accountant, MRIA and !MI 
Curran, Roger MD Member,DMR 
Former Chairman - MRIA 
Dallev, Mark CEO, Holy Rosarv Hospital 
DMR Doctor's Ma,metic Resonance, Inc. 
Flovd,Jack CEO, MRI Center and MRI Mobile 
Frv, Kenneth CFO, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
Giles, David MD Member, DMR 
GSR Gem State Radiolo!!V 
Hahn,Alan Consultant to SARMC, PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
Havlina, Jack MD Member, DMR 
Henson, Thomas MD Member, DMR 
Holv Rosarv Hosoital Partner, MRIA 
IMI Intermountain Medical Ima2im1 
Matzek, Robin Former COO of MRI Center of Idaho 
Messmer, Joe CEO, Mercv Medical Center 
MRIA MRI Associates, Inc. 
MRICI MRI Limited Partnership aka MRI Center of Idaho 
MRIM MRI Mobile 
Prochaska, James MD Member, DMR 
Chairman of Board- MRI Associates 
SADC Saint AlPhonsus Diversified Care, Inc. 
SARG Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group (dba Gem State 
Radiolo2v) 
SARMC Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
Schamp, Cindy Former COO, Saint Alphonsus Medical Center 
Steiner, Manfred Expert Regarding Value, SARMC 
Wallace, Hollv MRICI, Staffing Coordinator, Marketin" Director 
West Vallev Medical Center Partner, MRIA 
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IMI Exams at the Downtown Location 
Exams by Physicians 





Exams by Physicians Included in Damages: Other 
SARMC Affiliates 




• An estimated 10-15% of all diagnostic images in the U.S. are provided by outpatient diagnostic imaging 
centers. 
• More than 543 million diagnostic procedures were performed in 2003, compared to 300 million in 2000. 
• Spending for imaging services more than doubled between 2000 and 2005, from $6.6 billion to $13.7 billion. 
• Implied annual growth rate in spending between 2000 and 2005 is 15. 7%. 








Historical MRI Procedure Growth 
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MRIA Damages - Yearly Totals 
1999 2000 2001 2002 J2op3'. 2004 200s 2006 
434 2,033 3,011 3,784 4,520 4,782 4,718 7,539 
$252,749 $1,254,972 $1,927,852 $23,447 $2,624,501 $2,882,322 $2,704,967 $3,712,377 





MRIA Damages - From IMI Downtown 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
I 
/Total 
Lost Scans 434 2,033 3,011 2,600 2,180 1,950 1,667 1,548 15,423 
Lost Profits $252,749 $ 1,254,972 $ 1,927,852 $1,566,169 $1,375,115 $ 1,274,214 $963,754 $ 805,507 $9,420,332 
MRIA Damages - From IMI Meridian 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Lost Scans 1,184 2,340 2,832 2,989 3,069 12,414 
Lost Profits ($1,542,722) $1,249,386 $1,608,108 $1,711,793 $1,523,221 $4,549,786 
MRIA Damages - From IMI SARMC 
2005 2006 Total 
Lost Scans 62 2,922 2,984 






_ Comparison of Causation Facts 
MRIA's Facts in Support of Causation SARMC's Facts 
Against Causation 
MRIA damages were based only on scans Jost to !Ml. (TR Vol. The referrals switched because of 
II at 2767:25-2768:6.) the renutation of the radioloeists 
SARMC-employed physicians and physicians with privileges at 
SARMC referred patients to MRI CI because of its affiliation 
with SARMC. (Id at 1517:12-19.) 
SARMC and GSR had the relationship with the referring 
doctors. (TR 3617:24-3619:15, 3626:5-15, 3233:9-14.) 
!Ml came into existence with SARMC's support. (Trial Exs. 
545, 4074, 4095.) 
SARMC joint ventured with the radiologists in IM! from !Mi's 
beginning. (Id.; See supra. MRIA's Brief, Part 1.E-H.) 
SARMC conspired with the radiologists to compete with MRIA 
through !Ml. (R. Vol. XII at 2296.) 
After initially joint venturing with IMI, SARMC formally joined 
IMI as a partner while still a partner in MRIA. 
SARMC usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with the 
radioloeists (See supra. MRIA's Brief, Part 1.F-G.) 
SARMC usurped MRIA's Meridian opportunity. (See 
supra.MRIA's Brief, Part I.H.6.) 
SARMC made IM! an outpatient center which caused MRIA to 
Jose scans. (TR Vol. II at 1582:10-1583:24; TR Vol. Ill at 
3206:16-3207:13 
SARMC jointly marketed IMI with the radiologists while still a 
partner in MRIA. (Trial Exs. 4248 & 4107; TR Vol. II at 1643-
1646, 2420:11-16, 2428:21-2429:6; TR Vol. Ill at 4169:10-17.) 
SARMC provided !MI with exclusive IT support from !Mi's 
inception including a $780,000 investment. Basically, SARMC 
"was there with [IMI] making that investment in getting doctors 
over the technology hump" and helping bring the "digital 
revolution" to IMI while MRIA was left in the cold. (TR Vol. II 
at 1505-1512, 1618-1620, 1639:18-24, 1634:12-15, 2433-2440, 
2453:6-24543:9; Trial Exhibit 4231at 3.) 
SARMC provided IMI with significant financial support while 
still a partner in MRIA including $546, 146 in cash and 
assumption of$1.5 million ofJMJ's debt. (Id. at 1557:4-1558:2; 
1622:22-1623:8.) 
SARMC delivered a written mandate to all of its employees, 
including referring physicians, directing all patients be sent to 
the IMI magnet rather than to MRICI. (Trial Ex. 4377.) 
SARMC also supported IMI to the detriment ofMRIA by 
refusing to provide any assistance to MRIA concerning the Gem 
State Radiology's severe reduction in coverage to MRIA. (TR 
Vol. II at 2505:1-2517:24; 2520:19-21; 252:2-12; 2528:2-20; 
2534:25-2535:3.) Because of this reduction in coverage, MRIA 
lost almost all of their weekend referrals to IMI. (Id. at 2520: 19-
21.) 
Jeff Cliff, IMl's business manager, testified that MRIA lost 
scans due to SARMC's affiliation with IM!. (Id. at 1517: 12-19; 
1536:13-19.) In fact, before IM! opened, SARMC provided 
records of its case volume to IM! to help IM! develop a business 
plan. (Trial Ex. 4095.) Thus, it was always assumed SARMC 
affiliated physicians would follow SARMC to IM!. Cliff also 
testified that before IM! opened "most" referring doctors 
affiliated with SARMC sent their patients to MRIA. (Id. at 
1517:12-19.) Cliff further testified he has "no doubt" that IMI 
caused MRIA to lose scans. (Id. at 1536:13-19.) Other witnesses 
testified that association with SARMC was a powerful marketing 
tool with referring physicians. (Id. at 2420:5-16.) The chairman 
ofMRIA's board testified that the scans were being lost directly 
to IM!. (1301:24-1302: I.) Even SARMC's own expert testified 
that MRIA lost scans to !MI as a result ofSARMC's support of 
IM! instead ofMRIA. {TR Vol. III at 3206:11-3207:13.) He 
acknowledged that because SARMC departed the partnership, 
the going concern value ofMRIA must be calculated without 
SARMC's "inpatient, outpatient and ER scans". Id. 
One of the referring doctors called by SARMC stated that he 
sent his referrals to SARMC thereby showing that it was the 




Q: Did you have an understanding. during the course of your 
engagement on this particular project for Saint Alphonsus, that it 
was understood by Saint Alphonsus that if it withdrew and 
competed with the existing MRI facilities on its own campus, that 
they would likely -- that that would likely engender litigation? 
A. Was it a potential? Yes. 
Q. And what were the likely sources of that information? 
A. Pat Miller and the client. 
(TR Vol. II at 2567:-2568:3 (emphasis added)). 
Q. And then it goes on: 'Givens Pursley believes that there would 
likely be litigation as to whether the termination was wrongful and 
that there may be a risk of Saint Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary 
responsibilities to the LPs.' What does LP refer to there? 
A. Limited partners. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. And was this your understanding that there 
would likely be litigation as to whether or not the termination was 
wrongful in the context of this withdrawal scenario? 
A. Given the context of this statement on this page and the nature 
of how it was likely communicated, you know, by the fact that it's 
in here and he's writing it and I read it, that I certainly was. This 
was a review document I reviewed. 
(TR Vol. II at 2579:3-21 (emphasis added)). 
Q: The next sentence says: "Unfortunately, the noncompete 
agreement contained in the general partnership agreement for 
MRIA precludes Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center from 
doing so." Is that your understanding? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And do you recall how you learned that? 
A. Likely, Pat Miller. 
(TR. Vol. II at 2565:22 (emphasis added)). 
Q: Is it your understanding that this MRI, non-MRI distinction 
referenced in the prior paragraph did not satisfy the long-term 
strategic objectives of Saint Alphonsus? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What would be your source of information for these two pieces 
of information that we've just discussed? 
A. Likely the client and Pat Miller." 
(TR. Vol. II at 2575:1-9 (emphasis added)). 
Q. Did you have an understanding during the course of your 
assignment that Saint Alphonsus would have to wait one year after 
exiting the general partnership before competing in magnetic 
resonance imaging within 100 miles of Boise? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was the likely source of that information? 
A. Pat Miller and the client. 
(TR. Vol. II at 2576:4-13 (emphasis added)). 
Q. As you sit here today, do you remember talking about an 
alternative that included selling - Saint Alphonsus selling its share 
in MRI Associates to one of the hospital partners? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was your likely source for that information? 
A. Pat Miller and the client likely. 
(TR Vol. II at 2580:2402581 :7 (emphasis added)). 
Q. Do you remember talking about the possibility that the hospital 
would transfer MRI ownership to an affiliate and then sever ties 
with the affiliate? 
A. Yes. 
And what was your likely source for that information? 
A. Pat Miller and the client. 
(TR Vol. II at 2581 :9-16 (emphasis added)). 

